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Abstract
This thesis contains four chapters. Chapter One presents an introduction to the chapters that follow.
Chapters Two to Four each have a distinct research focus with an underlying New Keynesian dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium framework. Chapters Two and Three build on earlier collaborative research
with Chris Martin. In Chapter Two, I use Behavioural theory to explain nonlinearities in the UK
macroeconomy. Chapter Three presents a search frictions model of graduates and non-graduates in the
UK labour market, simulating the differing impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on both categories of
worker. Chapter Four discusses the implications of the rising gig economy for wages and output in the
UK.
Behavioural Downward Wage Rigidity and Macroeconomic Nonlinearity
A growing body of evidence suggests that the macroeconomy is not linear: shocks have a stronger
impact on output in recessions than in expansions, negative shocks have a stronger impact on output
than positive shocks of the same magnitude, large and small shocks have disproportional impacts on
output, inflation and the real wage. To explain this, I develop a New Keynesian model with downward
real wage rigidity, which I motivate using behavioural arguments. Workers experience disutility from
exerting effort during production, but they also derive satisfaction from exerting effort when they feel
‘fairly’ treated by the firm. These behavioural elements generate the downward real wage rigidity which
implies a convex Phillips Curve that is flatter when the output gap is negative. In the model, the
intersection of the aggregate demand curve with this convex Phillips Curve generates nonlinearity that
matches the empirical evidence.
To demonstrate non-linearity and asymmetry, I simulate the impacts of small and large, and positive
and negative aggregate demand shocks. The results suggest that high inflation can be beneficial; the
Phillips curve being steeper when the output gap is positive and flatter when the output gap is negative
implies that at moderately high levels of inflation, much higher levels of output can be attained.
Modelling the Differing Impacts of COVID-19 in the UK Labour Market
Due to the actual and potential loss of life from the COVID-19 virus outbreak, the UK government
announced a nationwide Lockdown in March, 2020. Businesses were closed, movement was restricted and
many workers began working from home, albeit with reduced productivity. Workers who were unable
to work from home were faced with job loss and the data shows marked differences in the impact of
the pandemic across different sectors and types of worker. We model the impact of the pandemic on
graduates and non-graduates in the UK. We use a model that is designed around key features of the UK
labour market, which we simulate using shocks designed to mimic the pandemic. The model predicts
that non-graduates would face more adverse impacts of the pandemic than graduates: about 1.2 million
non-graduates would lose their jobs by the end of 2020, compared to 0.4 million for graduates, and by
the end of 2020Q3, about 2 million non-graduates would be unemployed, compared to below 1million
graduates.
x
0. List of Tables
The chapter describes the differing labour market experiences of different types of worker in the
UK Labour market during the COVID-19 pandemic, and highlights the importance of accounting for
segmented markets in policy-making.
The Impact of the Rising Gig Economy on UK Wages and Output
The nature of work in the UK is changing. Before the last 30 years, gig work was an option for
firms to temporarily cut costs or respond to macroeconomic shocks, and for workers between traditional
employment or to earn additional income. Now, gig work is becoming the ‘new normal’; compared to
the EU, the UK has the highest proportion of the workforce engaged in some form of gig work and the
number continues to rise. I examine the implications for wage and output growth.
I construct a dual labour market search frictions model that describes the increasing distinction
between the gig and traditional sectors in the UK. The model explains the difference in the wage for the
same type of job between the traditional and gig sectors. I show that the rising gig economy can explain
the UK’s slow wage and output growth in the past decade. The results also support the evidence that gig
work can be a stepping stone to traditional employment and vice versa, but it makes job-finding difficult
for the unemployed. The results also show that the presence of the gig economy in the UK changes the







This chapter presents an overview of the concepts and models discussed in Chapters Two, Three and
Four.
In Chapter Two, I discuss the convex Phillips Curve and macroeconomic nonlinearities. Since the past
four decades, there has been growing evidence that the Phillips Curve has flattened (Borio and Filardo
(2007), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015)), is nonlinear and convex (Debelle and Laxton (1997), Gagnon
and Collins (2019)). Convexity implies that the Phillips Curve is steeper during periods of expansion
and flatter in downturns. There is also evidence that the macroeconomy is not linear: shocks have a
stronger impact on output in recessions than in expansions (Mandler (2012)), negative shocks have a
stronger impact on output than positive shocks and the impact of large shocks are disproportional to
those of small shocks ( Ravn and Sola (2004)). Furthermore, output tends to fall more than it tends to
rise (McKay and Reis (2008)), and the reverse is observed with the real wage (Abbritti and Fahr (2011)).
In a linear macroeconomy, these differences are absent.
There is widespread evidence of the relationship between wage rigidity and the convex Phillips Curve.
Downward wage rigidity implies that wages fall by less in response to a reduction in the output gap than
they increase in response to an increase in the output gap of the same size. This imact of wage rigidity is
transferred through the marginal cost to inflation, resulting in a Phillips Curve that is convex. The model
in Chapter 2 combines Behavioural theory with the standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model to explain the evidence outlined above. I adopt evidence in the Behavioural Literature
that: i) workers derive disutility from exerting effort on the job, ii) the amount of effort workers exert
depends on the wage, iii) workers have a wage which they feel entitled to, this is the fair wage, iv)
workers are more inclined to increase their fair wage than to decrease it, v) workers feel fairly treated
by the firm when the firm pays a wage that is above the fair wage, vi) when workers feel fairly treated
by the firm, they exert reciprocity effort, and vii) workers are averse to reductions in the wage and this
impacts effort (Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Bewley (2004)). The model describes how these features shape
the macroeconomy, resulting in real wage rigidity, nonlinearity and asymmetry.
This chapter contributes to the Literature in two ways: Most models on wage rigidity, macroeconomic
nonlinearities and the convex Phillips Curve often assume that real wage rigidity is derived from nominal
wage rigidity without detailed derivations and explanations (eg Benigno and Ricci (2011)). In this
chapter, I follow the evidence and propose that real wage rigidity generates nominal wage rigidity. The
model in this chapter shares features with other behavioural DSGE macroeconomic models, such as
Danthine and Kurmann (2010), Dickson and Fongoni (2019), Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) and Martin and
Wang (2018). I incorporate evidence from the Behavioural Literature into a standard New Keynesian
DSGE model to derive a Phillips Curve and macroeconomic nonlinearities that match the data.
Chapters Three and Four also use DSGE models, but have a different research focus. Both chapters
combine search and matching theory with DSGE models. Chapter Three analyses the different experi-
ences of graduates and non-graduates in the UK Labour Market during the COVID-19 pandemic. The
shocks due to the pandemic and Lockdown have affected the whole economy, but have been more severe
in sectors with a greater number of non-graduate roles. Fig. 1.1) shows the percentage of graduates and
non-graduates in the different sectors in the UK in 2017Q3. The chart shows a greater number of non-
graduates in the hospitality, manufacturing, construction and transportation sectors. These sectors also
have higher numbers of at-risk jobs, jobs which cannot be performed remotely, and jobs which provide
non-essential services which were subject to complete closure during the nationwide Lockdown.
In addition, data from the Office for National Statistics1 show that graduates in the UK have higher
average earnings and a higher employment rate than non-graduates, and about half of the employed

































































































































more likely to be unemployed than graduates. These evidence have meant that non-graduates, who are
normally in less secure and lower-paying jobs than graduates, have faced more severe impacts of the
pandemic.
The model in Chapter Three describes the flows of graduates between graduate and non-graduate
roles, and the movement of non-graduates across non-graduate roles. Using early projections for GDP
and unemployment to calibrate the different shocks in the model, the differing impact of the pandemic
on graduate and non-graduate wages, employment and unemployment becomes clear.
There have been many research contributions on the impact of the pandemic, including Susceptible-
Infectious-Recovered (SIR)-DSGE models (eg Eichenbaum et al. (2020)), and DSGE models with adverse
demand and supply shocks (eg Mihailov (2020), Guerrieri et al. (2020)). The model presented in this
chapter differs from others in the pandemic literature in two major ways: it describes the impact of the
pandemic on an economy with segmented labour and goods markets, and the pandemic is modelled as
a combination of aggregate demand and supply shocks, including shocks specific to the labour market.
The pandemic has uncovered the disparities between different workers and jobs in the UK, and this
chapter attempts to address this. The results show that non-graduates are more severely affected by the
pandemic than non-graduates. The model can serve as a template for examining the impacts of targeted
government policy and public health measures, and the paths to economic recovery for the UK.
The final chapter discusses the rise in the UK gig economy. As shown in Fig. 1.2), there is a rising
trend in UK lone-working self-employment, people working part-time because they are unable to find
full-time employment, freelancers and contractors, agency and zero-hour contract workers. These workers
often engage in temporary, on-demand or non-employee work arrangements which are collectively called
gig work.2
Unlike the more traditional type of employment, gig jobs are characterised by high flexiblility and
high turnover, often require low skills and offer low pay. Chapter Four discusses the factors driving the
UK gig economy, the flows of workers between gig work and traditional employment and the implications
for aggregate output and wages.
A significant amount of study has been done on gig work. However, most of these studies are in
form of surveys and reports,3 and often focus on online or app-based gig jobs. In this chapter, I attempt
to capture the entire gig economy by including both online and offline gig workers. Secondly, academic
rersearch on the gig economy and the impact on the macroeconomy are less common, and have mostly
been done on the US labour market (eg Bracha and Burke (2016; 2021). I use the UK Labour Force
Survey data to construct a two-sector model that describes the gig and traditional sectors of the UK. I
use the model to explain why gig workers earn lower wages than traditional workers doing the same type
of job, and show that the gig economy may help explain the slow wage and output growth in the UK in
the past decade.
The results show that the presence of the gig economy changes the macroeconomic response to shocks.
The model shows that gig workers earn a lower wage than traditional workers doing the same job because
of differences in bargaining power, productivity and hiring costs. The results suggest that the moderating
impact of shocks due to the presence of the gig economy can reduce the effectiveness of policies. The
results also show that, in line with the evidence (eg in Booth et al. (2002)), gig work can be a stepping-
stone to traditional work and vice versa, might reduce unemployment, but would potentially reduce
wages and the quality of work as the gig economy expands.
At the end of this thesis, the reader would have been presented with three DSGE models varying in
2Workers who hold part-time jobs because they cannot find full-time work are included in this category because of the
evidence that these workers often hold multiple part-time jobs which do not always add up to full-time employment (Bell
and Blanchflower (2011), Bell and Blanchflower (2018b)).
3For example, The Good work: The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices by Taylor et al. (2017), surveys by






























































































































































































































































































































































application and complexity. The reader would understand the relationship between wage rigidity and
macroeconomic nonlinearities, be familiar with the Behavioural Literature on fair wages, worker effort
and reciprocity, and understand how these can impact the macroeconomy. The reader would encounter
slightly more complex DSGE models later in the thesis, with labour market search frictions The reader
would gain insight into the segmented nature of the labour and goods markets which make up the UK
economy, the possible implications for workers, firms and policy-makers during adverse macroeconomic
conditions such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and in the long term.
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2. Behavioural Downward Wage Rigidity and Macroeconomic Nonlinearity
Note: This chapter builds on earlier joint work conducted with Chris Martin, who is a Professor of
Economics at University of Bath, cim21@bath.ac.uk. The research is included in this thesis with his
consent.
2.1 Introduction
A growing body of evidence suggests that the macroeconomy is not linear. This evidence includes studies
that find that monetary policy shocks have a stronger impact on output in recessions than in expansions
(eg Mandler (2012)) and that negative monetary and fiscal policy shocks have a stronger impact on
output than positive shocks (eg Barnichon and Matthes (2014), Fazzari et al. (2015) and Ravn and Sola
(2004)). There is also evidence that the impact of shocks is size-dependent, so the impact of large shocks
is not proportional to the impact of small shocks (eg Balke (2000) and Mittnik and Semmler (2013)). A
third strand in the literature has highlighted the negative skew of output growth (eg McKay and Reis
(2008), Sichel (1993)) and the positive skew of inflation and the real wage (eg Abbritti and Fahr (2011),
Adjemian et al. (2016)).
To explain this evidence, this chapter presents a New Keynesian model with downward real wage
rigidity, motivated using behavioural arguments. Downward real wage rigidity implies a convex Phillips
Curve, flatter when the output gap is negative. In the model, intersection of the aggregate demand curve
with this convex Phillips Curve generates nonlinearity that matches the empirical evidence.
The convex Phillips Curve was proposed by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) and Debelle and
Laxton (1997).1 More recent studies in Babb and Detmeister (2017), Doser et al. (2017), Gagnon and
Collins (2019), Gross and Semmler (2019), Hooper et al. (2019), Nalewaik (2016) and Santoro et al.
(2014) provide further evidence of convexity.
There is widespread evidence of the relationship between wage rigidity and the convex Phillips Curve.
Downward wage rigidity implies that wages fall by less in response to a reduction in the output gap than
they increase in response to an increase in the output gap of the same size. As a result, deviations of
the wage from their steady-state value are a convex function of the output gap. If wages are the main
driver of a firm’s marginal cost, this implies that the New Keynesian Phillips Curve is convex. But
the evidence of real and nominal wage rigidities is less definitive. For instance, Babecky et al. (2010),
Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) and Messina et al. (2010) find evidence of both real and nominal wage
rigidities, but stronger evidence for nominal wage rigidity, Fagan and Messina (2009) find evidence of
real and nominal wage rigidities to varying degrees in different countries,2 Caju et al. (2009) support the
evidence for real wage rigidity, but Martins et al. (2019), Stűber (2017) and Schaefer and Singleton (2019)
find that real wages are not rigid. In addition, where real wage rigidity is proposed in the literature,
the explanations are problematic. Downward real wage rigidity is assumed to be caused by downward
nominal wage rigidity. In a prominent paper in the literature, Benigno and Ricci (2011) demonstrate the
long-run trade-off between wage inflation and the output gap where the Phillips Curve is non-linear.3
They assume that nominal wages are chosen by workers, and rigidity arises because workers cannot
choose to reduce their wage. In their paper, downward rigidity is exogenous, citing links to fairness
and wage norms. Others assume that workers face periodic wage-setting constraints (Daly and Hobijn
1There are other views Coen et al. (1999) and Stiglitz (1997) argue for concavity, while Eisener (1997, 1998) and Corrado
and Holly (2003) argue that the Phillips curve is convex when unemployment is low but concave when it is high. Others
(eg Gordon (1997) and Mussoa et al. (2009) argue that evidence for nonlinearity is not strong.
2Fagan and Messina (2009) find evidence of nominal wage rigidity in the US, Germany and Portugal, but for Finland
and Belgium, they find strong evidence of real wage rigidity and little evidence of nominal wage rigidity.
3The trade-off between output an inflation implies that an economy can lower inflation by temporarily lowering output,
and vice versa. This trade-off is more pronounced when the Phillips Curve is non-linear. For example, if the Phillips Curve
is convex, during periods of low inflation, an increase in inflation would yield a greater increase in output, meaning that
significant output growth can be achieved with lower cost to inflation. It also implies that high inflation can be reduced
with low costs to output. See Akerlof, Dickens, Perry, Gordon and Mankiw (1996) for detailed discussion.
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(2014)), that there are asymmetric costs to wage adjustments (Fagan and Messina (2009)), or that the
wage depends on the past wage and is inflexible downwards (Dupraz et al. (2019)). But the source of
these constraints on wage adjustment are not clearly explained. In the absence of a reason for these
constraints, existing models of a convex Phillips Curve are somewhat arbitrary.4
I follow the literature in explaining the convex Phillips Curve with downward real wage rigidity. I
adopt evidence from the Behavioural Literature and provide an alternative motivation for downward real
wage rigidity.5 I assume that workers experience disutility from exerting effort but also derive intrinsic
satisfaction from working. I use the approach developed by Danthine and Kurmann (2010) to model
reciprocity towards employers. However, as will be discussed below, this framework is also consistent
with other reasons for intrinsic satisfaction, including utility derived from doing meaningful work and
adhering to moral standards (eg Mazar et al. (2008)), adhering to social norms (eg Benabou and Tirole
(2006)), from impure altruism (eg Andreoni (1989)) or from signaling pro social behaviour (eg Frey and
Meier (2004)).
I assume that workers evaluate their labour market experience relative to a reference “fair wage”; an
amount to which they feel entitled (Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Bewley (1999), Goodman
(1974), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kahneman et al. (1986)).6 Survey evidence indicates that worker
morale increases when they receive a “generous wage” offer from the firm, that is, a wage offer that is
greater than the fair wage (Bewley (1999), Bewley (2004)). The evidence also shows that the impact
of worker morale on output is not only from greater speed of work, but also from workers willingness
to perform additional tasks, exert effort without supervision and induce co-workers to act similarly
(ibid.). These confirm a positive relationship between fair wages, morale, reciprocity effort and output.
Therefore, I assume that output depends on effort exerted by workers, but is not observable by firms.
Put together, these evidence imply that effort is an increasing function of the difference between the
wage and the fair wage, and workers and firms are disinclined to wage reductions. To model this, I
assume that employed workers feel entitled to a share of the surplus generated by their employment and
therefore, the fair wage is pro-cyclical. It also becomes clear that the wage has a dual role in this model;
it guides the allocation of labour, but it also motivates the worker to provide effort. The firm makes
take-it-or-leave-it wage offers to workers that reflect this dual role. The wage balances the cost of the
increased wage bill against the benefits from increased effort at the margin. In this simple model, this
results in the wage being set as a mark-up over the fair wage.
Inflation is determined by the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Inflation depends on movements in
the real wage around steady-state and hence on movements in the fair wage around steady-state. The
behavioural literature shows that the fair wage increases more readily than it falls. Evidence for this
includes Agell and Lundborg (2003), Bewley (1999), Bewley (2007), Blinder and Choi (1990), Campbell
and Kamlani (1997), Chemin and Kurmann (2012), Galuscak et al. (2012), and Millard and Tatomir
(2015). This implies that movements in the fair wage around the steady-state are asymmetric; the fair
wage responds more strongly when the output gap rises than when it falls. So movements in the fair
wage and the real wage around steady-state are a convex function of the output gap. This results in real
wage rigidity and a convex Phillips Curve.
4In a related model, Abbritti and Fahr (2011) assume that nominal wages are determined through worker-firm bargaining
where there are asymmetric adjustment costs which imply that where it is more costly to reduce wages than to increase
them. The rationale for these asymmetric adjustment costs is not explained.
5Some of the literature has suggested that fairness issues underlie downward rigidity; for example Abbritti and Fahr
(2011) suggest that “the downward-rigidity constraint is purely exogenous in this model and could be rationalized by
considering every worker as associated with a union that does not allow the wage to decline for reasons related to fairness
and social norms”.
6Evidence for the importance of fair wages includes experimental studies such as Brown et al. (2004), Camerer (2003)
and Fehr et al. (2011), as well as other studies such as Cohn et al. (2014), Gneezy and List (2006) and Krueger and Mas
(2004). See Della Vigna (2009), Dickson and Fongoni (2019) and Fehr et al. (2009) for surveys of the evidence and Martin
and Wang (2018) for further discussion.
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The model shares features with other behavioural DSGE macroeconomic models, such as Campbell
(2008), Danthine and Donaldson (1990), Danthine and Kurmann (2010), de La Croix et al. (2009),
Kuang and Wang (2017) and Vaona (2013). But these models do not derive a convex Phillips Curve;
rather, they express the fair wage as a function of current and lagged values of productivity, output and
unemployment. This approach generates substantial macroeconomic persistence, but not the type of
nonlinearity I analyse in this paper. Dickson and Fongoni (2019) model the concepts of fairness, effort,
morale, reciprocity and downward wage rigidity, but also do not derive a Phillips Curve. Eliaz and
Spiegler (2014) and Martin and Wang (2018) incorporate these behavioural concepts into a search-and-
matching model to explore the implications for equilibrium wage and unemployment; the modeling of
effort and the supply side of this model is similar to the behavioural search frictions model in Martin
and Wang (2018).
To illustrate how the mechanism underlying the model generates nonlinear movements in the output
gap and inflation that match empirical evidence, I compare the impact of equally-sized positive and
negative shocks to demand on an economy that is in steady-state. The positive shock to aggregate
demand increases output. The fair wage of workers increases. Firms respond by increasing the real
wage. This leads to increased inflation. The negative shock leads to reduced output, a lower fair wage,
a reduction in the real wage and lower inflation. However, the increase in the output gap increases the
fair wage by more than the reduction in the output gap reduces it. This asymmetric response of the
fair wage results in a stronger response of the output gap to a negative shock than to a positive shock,
whereas inflation responds more to a positive shock than a negative shock. This is consistent with the
evidence of differing impacts of positive and negative shocks discussed above, with the evidence of a
negative skew to the output gap and with evidence of a positive skew to inflation and the real wage.
This mechanism also implies that a large positive shock will result in a proportionately larger response
of inflation and a proportionally smaller response of the output gap; this is consistent with the evidence
on the size-dependent impact of shocks.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Households











1 + ϕ −
νe1−χt





where C is household consumption of retail goods and η is the intertemporal elasticity of consumption,
N is the number of household members who are employed, w is the real wage, wfair is the fair wage
and e is the amount of effort exerted by employed household members. β and eεd represent the discount
factor and a preference shock respectively. Θ and ν are coefficients on the disutility of exerting effort
and utility of reciprocity effort respectively, ϕ represents the elasticity of the household’s disutility from
exerting effort, while χ is the elasticity of reciprocity effort where ϕ > 0, χ > 0 and ϕ+ χ > 1.
Households derive utility from consumption. Each employed household member experiences disutility
from exerting effort, given by D(et) = Θe
1+ϕ
t
1+ϕ . Assuming ϕ > 0 implies there is an increasing marginal
disutility of exerting effort. Each employed household member also gains utility from a reciprocity
response to the wage offered by the firm, given by R(et, wt − wfairt ) =
νe1−χt
1−χ (wt − w
fair
t ), where g(wt −
wfairt ) = (wt − w
fair




1−χ is the reciprocal effort response of the household following Koszegi and Rabin (2006) and
Rabin (1993). The assumption that χ > 0 ensures the reciprocal response is a convex function of effort.
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The household budget constraint is
PtwtNt + Ptb(1−Nt) + Πt +Bt−1 = PtCt + Tt + qtBt (2.2)
where P is the nominal price index for retail goods, wt is the real wage, b is real unemployment benefit,
Π is the household’s share of profits, B are one-period bonds, T is a lump-sum tax and q is the nominal
price of bonds. The household determines consumption, how many bonds to hold and how much effort
its employed members will exert.









where i is the nominal interest rate defined by q = 11+i and π is the inflation rate. Defining the real
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Although the model follows the approach of Danthine and Kurmann (2007) in deriving the optimal
effort, the effort function is different as the specifications of the g(wt) and d(et) in this model are
different. Here, households choose effort to maximise their utility function in (1), so the optimal level of
effort satisfies De(et) = Re(et, wt). Optimal effort is
et = ξ(wt − wfairt )σ (2.7)
for wt − wfairt > 0 and et = 0 for wt − w
fair
t ≤ 0, where σ = 1ϕ+χ and ξ = (
ν
ω )σ. This effort function
is widely used in the literature, including in Garino and Martin (2000), Heijdra (2017), Knell (2014),
Martin and Wang (2018), Romer (2006), and Summers (1988). It is consistent with the argument in
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that the sensitivity of effort to the wage should be larger when the wage
is closer to the fair wage. The assumption that ϕ + χ > 1 implies that the effort function is concave.
Effort functions similar to (2.7) have been estimated by Della Vigna and Pope (2018). They estimate a
low value for σ, indicating that the effort function is highly concave. Fig. 2.1) illustrates the implications
of the concave effort function that effort is more sensitive at small values of wt − wfairt .
An alternative approach used in the literature (eg Dickson and Fongoni (2019)) model the optimal
effort as a piece-wise function in which workers exhibit positive, normal and negative reciprocity effort
12
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Figure 2.1: The Effort Function
The concavity of the effort function is determined by σ. The figure shows a strong effort response when the difference
between the wage and the fair wage is small, and the reverse when the difference is large.
in response to wage offers which are higher, equal or lower than the fair wage respectively. Another
alternative is (eg Danthine and Kurmann (2010) and de La Croix et al. (2009)) is to assume that
D(e) = (e − e∗)2 without including reciprocity effects and so e = e∗. The effort function e∗ is then
specified using intuitive arguments. The approach used in this paper was chosen because of strong
empirical evidence of reciprocity effects, and because the functional form implies a smooth, continuous
effort function that is endogenous to the analysis. The Dickson and Fongoni (2019) approach implies a
“kinked” effort function, and the other alternatives assume, implausibly, a constant marginal disutility
of effort.
There are a number of measures of the fair wage in the Behavioural literature. Workers’ perception
of a fair wage can be based on their past wage (Kahneman et al. (1986)), a share of profits and the
firm’s ability to pay (Blanchflower and Oswald (1988), Hildreth and Oswald (1997)),7 internal wage
equity (Bewley (2004)), external wage equity, including through collective bargaining (Rees (1993)) and
minimum wage policies (Koenig et al. (2020)). There is also evidence that workers use multiple measures
to determine their fair wage (Goodman (1974), Kahneman (1992), Rees (1993)). The specification of
the fair wage in this model is compatible with the different measures of the fair wage in the literature
and the changes across the business cycle so that
wfairt = wfairss eγ0(e
γŷt−1) (2.8)
where wfairss is the real value of the fair wage in steady-state and eγ0(e
γŷt−1) is the loss aversion function
in Kőbberling and Wakker (2005). This exponential component captures the asymmetric movement of
the fair wage across the business cycle where ŷt = Yt−YssYss is the output gap, Yt is output and Yss is
output in steady-state. This functional form implies wfairt > wfairss when the output gap is positive and
wfairt < w
fair
ss when the output gap is negative as shown in Fig. 2.2).
The fair wage being an asymmetric convex function of the output gap means that when the output
gap is positive, a 1% increase in the output gap increases the fair wage by more than 1%, whereas, when
the output gap is negative, a 1% reduction in the output gap reduces the fair wage by less than 1%.
7This is related to the principle of dual entitlement of Kahneman et al. (1986); firms feel entitled to a referent profit as




Figure 2.2: The Fair Wage
The fair wage falls when the output gap falls and increases when the output gap increases. The convexity of the fair wage
curve is denoted by γ0. In the diagram, |−ŷt|= ŷt; there is a sharp increase in the fair wage for ŷt, but for −ŷt, there is
a smaller decrease in the fair wage. This is because the fair wage is linked to workers’ standard of living and well-being,
a measure of self-worth and their value to the firm (Bewley (1998)), and workers are loss averse (Kahneman et al. (1986),
Tversky and Kahneman (1991)). The asymmetry is captured by γ.
The fair wage can be approximated as








. Using (2.8) and (2.9), the movement in the fair wage across the business
cycle is approximately
ŵfairt = γ0(eγŷt − 1) (2.10)
The fair wage steady-state deviation is nonlinear. The specification of the fair wage in (2.8) implies
that the fair wage increases more in response to an economic expansion than it falls in response to a
contraction. This is further supported by Chemin and Kurmann (2012), who find empirical support
for the argument in Bewley (2007) that workers quickly come to feel entitled to their wage. Also, the
concavity of the effort function derived in (2.7) implies that effort is more responsive to reductions in the
wage relative to the fair wage than to increases of the same size. Further evidence on this is provided by
Kube et al. (2013), who found that wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity,
but that equivalent wage increases did not result in any productivity gains. These characteristics of the
fair wage and effort are taken into account when the firm determines the optimal wage offer.
2.2.2 Wholesale Firms
There is a continuum of identical wholesale firms on the unit interval. Wholesale firms use labour to
produce identical wholesale goods. These are sold to retail firms on a competitive market. Their output
depends on a technology shock, the number of workers employed and on the amount of effort exerted
by workers. Wholesale firms determine employment and wages. Wholesale firms cannot determine the
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level of effort, rather they influence this through their choice of the wage. Thus wholesale firms can
respond to an increase in demand along the extensive margin by increasing employment, or along the
intensive margin by increasing the wage to induce increased effort. The assumption that firms cannot
determine effort is in line with the literature on introducing behavioural effects into Real Business Cycle
and New Keynesian models (eg Danthine and Donaldson (1990) and Danthine and Kurmann (2010) and
distinguishes this approach from papers such as Gali and van Rens (2014) and Bils et al. (2014), in which
effort is determined through worker-firm bargaining. The assumption that the wage is determined by
wholesale firms rather than through worker-firm bargaining is consistent with behavioural macroeconomic
models such as Danthine and Donaldson (1990), Danthine and Kurmann (2010), contributions such as
Manning (2003), and the evidence that wage-posting is predominant in specific sectors or job types such
as the public sector, large firms, part-time and contract work (Brenzel et al. (2014), Hall and Krueger
(2008)).
The production function of wholesale firms is
YWt = AtNtet (2.11)
where YW is the output of the wholesale firm, A is a productivity shock common to all firms and I
assume At = eε
s
t .










where PW is the nominal price of wholesale goods. The firm chooses the wage and employment, max-
imising (2.12) subject to the effort function in (2.7).




where µt = PtPWt is the price mark-up in the retail sector. This implies that the relative price of wholesale





where mct = wtAtet is real marginal cost.




where ew is the derivative of effort with respect to the real wage. This balances the cost of a higher










Noting that the elasticity of effort with respect to the real wage is wt ewet = σ(
wt
wt−wfairt
) and that the job
creation condition implies Atetµt = wt, the optimality condition for the wage can be written as
σwt = wt − wfairt
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The wage offered by the firm is a markup on the fair wage. The wage depends on the fair wage through
the effort effect, with the markup increasing as the sensitivity of effort to changes in the wage increases.
Using (2.8), movements in the real wage across the business cycle are given by
ŵt = γ0(eγŷt − 1) (2.17)
Equation (2.17) exhibits the real wage rigidity that is the central mechanism driving this model: since
the real wage is a convex function of the output gap,8 an increase in the output gap leads to a larger
increase in the real wage than the reduction in the real wage following a reduction in the output gap of the
same size. Real wage rigidity arises because firms realise that the adverse effect of real wage reductions
on productivity offset the benefits of a reduced wage bill and so respond to a reduced output gap by
reducing the wage by less than they would do in the absence of fair wage considerations. Supporting
evidence for this is provided by Galuscak et al. (2012), who present survey evidence for 15 EU countries
showing that firms do not reduce wages in recessions because of the impact on effort. Similar findings
in Blinder and Choi (1990), Bewley (1999), Agell and Lundborg (2003) and Millard and Tatomir (2015)
show that this finding is robust.
2.2.3 Retail Firms
Retail firms purchase wholesale goods from wholesale firms in a competitive market and transform these
costlessly into differentiated retail goods which they sell to households They face a downward-sloping
demand curve and set the price of their output, subject to Calvo frictions on price adjustment.
Their production function is
Y (j)t = Y (j)Wt (2.18)
where Y (j)W is the amount of the wholesale good purchased by retail firm j. Real marginal cost, given by
(2.14), is the same for all retail firms. Retail firms can adjust their price in each period with probability





























where P (j)∗t is the price chosen by retail firm j at time t. In steady-state, the retail price is a mark-up
µ = εε−1 over marginal cost, the price of wholesale goods. Away from steady-state, the mark-up may
vary due to frictions on price adjustment.
8The fair wage specification in this model implies a smooth wage curve similar to the Fig. 2.2). A piece-wise specification
of the fair wage would result in a “kinked” wage-setting curve as described in Dickson and Fongoni (2019).
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2.2.4 Monetary Policy
I assume that the nominal interest rate follows the simple Taylor rule
it = i+ φππt + εit (2.22)
where ī is the steady-state interest rate, φπ is the policy response to inflation and εit is a monetary policy
shock. A rise in the interest rate will, from (2.3), reduce consumption in the current period relative to
future consumption.
2.2.5 The Phillips Curve
Linearising the price relationship in (2.21) around a zero inflation steady-state gives the New Keynesian
Philips Curve relationship (Gali and Gertler (1999))
πt = βEtπt+1 + κm̂ct (2.23)
where κ = (1−ω)(1−βω)ω . This relates inflation to the proportional deviation of the real marginal cost of
retail firms around its steady-state value. Using the definition of real marginal cost, this is
m̂ct = ŵt − êt − εst (2.24)
Noting that ŵt = ŵfairt and êt = σŵ
fair
t , I obtain
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ{(1− σ)ŵfairt − εst} (2.25)
Using (2.8), the resultant Phillips Curve is
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ{(1− σ)γ0(eγŷt − 1)− εst} (2.26)
Without effort and the behavioural features of the fair wage, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve relation-
ship would be linear, similar to Gali and Gertler (1999), although the underlying mechanism and the
structural parameters are different. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve in (2.26) is convex and asym-
metric reflecting the adjustment of the fair wage across the business cycle. In common with other recent
papers, such as Benigno and Ricci (2011) and Daly and Hobijn (2014), the model shows that downward
real wage rigidities lead to a convex Phillips Curve, but differ from this literature in arguing that real
wage rigidity originates from the workers perception of the fair wage at different points in the business
cycle and the impact on effort.
2.3 Simulation Evidence
This section presents simulation evidence showing how the model derived in this paper is consistent with
the empirical evidence discussed in the introduction. The model comprises the household intertemporal
optimality condition in (2.3), the effort function in (2.7), the fair wage in (2.8), the production function
in (2.11), the wage equation in (2.16), the monetary policy rule in (2.22), the Phillips Curve in (2.26)




The calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2.1). Where possible, parameters are calibrated in line
with the existing New Keynesian literature. I assume that retail firms are able to reset prices on average
every four quarters, so ω = 0.75. I use β = 0.99, η = 1.5 and ρπ = 1.5. Della Vigna and Pope (2018)
estimate an effort function similar to the optimal effort in (2.7). Based on their estimates, I calibrate
σ = 0.02. I calibrate the convexity and asymmetry parameters γ0 = 0.045 and γ = 19 respectively, so
that the Phillips Curve in (2.26) matches the Gross and Semmler (2019) estimate for the slope of the
Euro-area Phillips Curve which is 0.05 when the output gap is negative and 0.12 when the output gap
is positive.
To examine the impact of positive and negative, and large and small demand shocks, I use εdt =
ρdε
d
t−1 + %dt and assume %dt = ιd for t = 1 and %dt = 0 for other periods. A small positive demand shock
is ιd = 0.01, a large positive demand using is ιd = 0.02, a small negative demand shock is ιd = −0.01
and a large negative demand shock is ιd = −0.02. The persistence of the demand shock is ρd = 0.9.
Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value Source
ω Probability Wholesale Firm Cannot Reset Price 0.75 Gali and Gertler (1999)
β Discount Factor 0.99 Gali and Gertler (1999)
η Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 1.5 Gali and Gertler (1999)
ε Elasticity of Substitution between Retail Goods 11 Gali and Gertler (1999)





0.02 Della Vigna and Pope (2018)
ρπ Coeff. on Monetary Policy Rule 1.5 Author’s Calculation
γ Asymmetry of Fair Wage Function 19 Author’s Calculation
γ0 Convexity of Fair Wage Function 0.045 Author’s Calculation
ρd Demand Shock Persistence 0.9 Author’s Calculation
ιd Small Positive Demand Shock 0.01 Author’s Calculation
ιd Large Positive Demand Shock 0.02 Author’s Calculation
ιd Small Negative Demand Shock -0.01 Author’s Calculation
ιd Large Negative Demand Shock -0.02 Author’s Calculation
The Phillips Curve implied by these calibrations is depicted in Fig. 2.3). There is little sign of
asymmetry when the output gap is small. Asymmetry becomes prominent as output diverges from
equilibrium by more than 1%, with very clear differences in the inflation rates generated by output gaps
of 3% or more. This is consistent with evidence that inflation became less responsive to output during
the post-2008 recession (eg Ball and Mazumder (2011), Blanchard (2016), and Cecchetti et al. (2017).
2.3.2 Simulation Results
The model is solved numerically under perfect foresight using the method of Fair and Taylor (1983).9 The
method assumes that the values of all shocks are known in advance. For a similar approach, see Lindé
and Trabandt (2018). The results are shown in Figure 2.4). The left hand panel shows the responses of
9The Fair and Taylor (1983) method uses solutions of the nonlinear model rather using a linearisation of the model. This
method is preferable because the Phillips Curve is close to being linear when the output gap is small and so a lineariation
around the steady-state cannot capture the impact of the convex Phillips Curve.
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Figure 2.3: The Behavioural Phillips Curve
Convexity and asymmetry are transmitted from the fair wage to the wage, marginal cost and on to inflation. At γ0 = 0.045
and γ = 19, the Behavioural Phillips Curve is convex and asymmetric.
the fair wage, the output gap and the inflation rate to the alternative demand shocks. The right hand
panel shows the normalised impulse responses, where the impulse response is divided by the value of the
shock.
The impulse responses show that positive demand shocks have a larger impact on the fair wage than
negative shocks and a small negative shock has a proportionately larger effect than a large negative
shock. Through this mechanism, the impulse responses of inflation and the output gap are able to match
the empirical evidence discussed above. Negative demand shocks have a stronger impact on output than
positive shocks, consistent with empirical evidence in Barnichon and Matthes (2014), Fazzari et al. (2015)
and Ravn and Sola (2004). Large negative demand shocks have a proportionately stronger impact on
output than small negative shocks, consistent with evidence in Balke (2000) and Mittnik and Semmler
(2013). The output gap has a negative skew while inflation has a positive skew, consistent with evidence
in Abbritti and Fahr (2011), Adjemian et al. (2016), McKay and Reis (2008) and Sichel (1993)).
2.4 Conclusions
This chapter brings together the New Keynesian and Behavioural literatures to provide a unified ex-
planation for macroeconomic nonlinearities. Firms require workers to exert effort but effort is difficult
to observe. Workers dislike exerting effort but will exert reciprocity effort when they feel that they are
treated fairly by the firm. Incorporating these behavioural features into a simple New Keynesian model
provides a tractable explanation for downward real wage rigidity that matches the behaviour of wages,
output and inflation: in a downturn, wages do not fall because of fairness concerns and the impact on
worker effort. This induces the asymmetric responses and skews on output and inflation.
Although there is strong evidence of nonlinearities in the macroeconomy, estimates of the nonlinear-
ities are few. The model will benefit from more precise estimates of the convexity and asymmetry in
both the New Keynesian and Behavioural Literatures. As the slope of the Phillips Curve in this model
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and asymmetry might make the model useful in explaining the evidence that the slope of the Phillips
Curve changes or can seem to disappear (Hooper et al. (2020)). It also suggests that the inflation target
may need to be adjusted if behavioural factors change. Fianlly, the results suggest that high inflation
can be beneficial; the Phillips curve being steeper when the output gap is positive and flatter when the
output gap is negative implies that at moderately high levels of inflation, much higher levels of output
can be attained. Similar to Benigno and Ricci (2011), the model can be extended to analyse the impact
of stabilisation policies and the output inflation trade-off.
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3.1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has severely disrupted economies across the world and put health care systems
under enormous stress. This paper models the response of the labour market in the UK to the pandemic.
The COVID-19 crisis has had a major impact on the UK labour market. At the peak of the pandemic,
only around 50% of workers were at work and up to 10 million workers were furloughed as part of the
Job Retention Scheme (JRS) (Leslie (2020), PWC (2020)). Two thirds of employers made use of the
JRS. GDP fell by 20% in April 2020, and is widely forecast to be at least 10% lower in 2020 compared
to 2019. Unemployment is forecast to rise to at least 3 million, or 9% of the workforce.1
We address the questions: How has the pandemic affected the labour market experience of different
types of workers in the UK? And what is the likely adjustment process as the economy recovers? We
address these questions using a DSGE model with labour market frictions, designed to reflect the UK
labour market. We simulate this model using a series of shocks that are constructed to mimic the effects
of the pandemic, and track the movements of output, employment, unemployment, job losses, wages
and inflation over the course of the crisis. We adapt the models of Blanchard and Gali (2010), Thomas
(2008) and Ravenna and Walsh (2011)2 to allow for three key features of the UK labour market. First,
the labour market experience of different types of worker differs markedly. Some workers, typically those
with university-level qualifications, have higher wages and greater job security than non-graduates (ONS
(2017a)). The pandemic has highlighted this disparity, as lower paid workers with lower qualifications
were more likely to be in key occupations and at higher risk from the virus (Gustafsson and McCurdy
(2020)). Second, the distribution of graduates across occupations is complex, with over one third of
graduates employed in “non-graduate” occupations (ONS (2017a)). And third, there is substantial
movement of workers between jobs and between sectors, with most hires coming from workers who are
already employed rather than from the unemployed (ONS (2017c)).3
Reflecting these features, our model distinguishes between workers with higher qualifications, who
we identify as graduates, and workers with lower qualifications. We also distinguish between “high
productivity” and “low productivity” firms; as we document below, high productivity firms pay higher
wages and offer greater job security. We assume that only graduates can work in high productivity
firms, while all workers can work at low productivity firms.4 5 As we describe below, the UK labour
1The Bank of England projects a 9% unemployment rate (BoE (2020a)). The Office for Budgetary Responsibility
projects 11.9% (OBR (2020)).
2Faccini et al. (2013) analyse this type of model for the UK.
3Only 28% of new hires in groups 1)-3) in the UK Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) (ONS (2009)): “Man-
agers, directors & senior officials”, “Professional occupations” and “Associate professional & technical”, come from the
unemployed. And only 46% of workers with lower qualifications into groups 4)-9) of the SOC come from the unemployed.
4Two sector DSGE models with labour market frictions have been developed to address policy issues in less developed
countries, where the distinction between the “formal” and “informal“ sectors is important (eg Castillo and Montoro (2012b)
and Mattesini and Rossi (2009).). In contrast to our model, these models typically assume that only unemployed workers
can be hired by any firm. They also differ from our model by assuming either no mobility (so only high qualification workers
can work at high productivity firms and only low qualification workers can work at low productivity firms) or complete
mobility (all workers are identical and can do any job).
5Our model has similarities with the literature on “good jobs and bad jobs” (eg Gertler et al. (2020a) and Faccini and
Melosi (2020)). In these models, both employed and unemployed workers can be hired. The productivity of a job match
is random and so low productivity job matches can arise even though workers and firms are identical. In our model, “bad
matches” are not random; rather they arise when high qualification workers are employed by low productivity firms.
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market is characterised by flows of workers moving between high productivity jobs, moving between low
productivity jobs, moving from low productivity jobs to high productivity jobs, and vice versa. There
are also flows of workers from unemployment to and from high and low productivity jobs. In our model,
we generate worker flows to match these data through job search. New hires into high productivity
jobs can be from unemployment, from another high productivity job or from a low productivity job.
New hires of lower qualification workers into low productivity jobs can come from unemployment or
from another low productivity job. New hires of higher qualification workers into low productivity jobs
can come from unemployment, from another low productivity job or from a high productivity job. In
addition, since all jobs can end, there are also flows of high and low qualification workers out from low
productivity firms into unemployment and flows of high qualification workers from high productivity
firms into unemployment.
We model the impact of COVID-19 on the UK labour market as a series of simultaneous adverse
shocks. Baqaee and Farhi (2020) use a similar approach, modelling the impact of the pandemic on the
US as an “omnibus of various supply and demand shocks”. Related work includes Maria del Rio-Chanona
et al. (2020), who investgate how COVID-19 has led to the adverse supply and demand shocks in the US
and Fornaro and Wolf (2020) and Guerrieri et al. (2020), who conceptualise the transmission of adverse
supply shocks into adverse demand shocks. Other models (eg Eichenbaum et al. (2020)) incorporate
simple Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered epidemiological processes into DSGE models, to analyse how
households may have reduced labour supply and consumption demand in response to COVID-19, gen-
erating a large, persistent recession. Mihailov (2020) incorporates these effects into the DSGE model of
Gaĺı et al. (2020) to estimate the impact of COVID-19. Our model has similarities with this approach,
but has a greater emphasis on the labour market experience of different types of workers, on labour
market frictions and on wage bargaining.
We classify the shocks in our simulation as being either aggregate supply or aggregate demand shocks.
Aggregate supply shocks comprise shocks that reduce the workforce due to workers being in self-isolation
or sick with COVID-19; shocks that increase job destruction;6 shocks that reduce productivity, due to
employees working from home or being furloughed as part of the Job Retention Scheme;7 and shocks
to wages, due to the state paying a proportion of wages as part of the JRS. Reflecting UK evidence on
the incidence of these shocks in different sectors, the severity of these shocks differs between high- and
low productivity jobs. Aggregate demand shocks comprise shocks that rise from households reducing
expenditure in response to the pandemic, and having reduced opportunities to spend;8 and shocks to
the interest rate due to the monetary policy response to the crisis.9 We also model a shock to the
composition of aggregate demand to capture the especially large demand fall in the hospitality, leisure
and related sectors.10
Simulations of our model broadly match other predictions of the economic impact of the pandemic
at the aggregate level. In our baseline scenario, output falls sharply but then recovers relatively quickly,
returning to pre-pandemic levels by mid-2021. Unemployment increases to 3.0 million workers, an unem-
ployment rate of 8.7%; unemployment recovers slowly and does not return to pre-pandemic levels until
6The impact of these shocks is modelled for the US by Arbex et al. (2020).
7Similar schemes are in place Germany, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands and other countries, based on the German
“Kurzarbeit” model, (Rothwell and Van Drie (2020)).
8This has been partly offset by increases in Government expenditure; for example, expenditure on health and social
care increased by nearly 50% in the early stages of the pandemic. These were financed by large increases in borrowing,
around £50 billion per month.
9The Bank of England has responded strongly to the pandemic, announcing renewed Quantitative Easing purchases
that increased the total stock of asset purchases to £745 billion by the end of June. It also undertook long-term lending
to banks at low interest rates, with the intention that this results in increased low-rate credit flows to firms, and increased
it’s loan facility for the UK Treasury.




2022. Our baseline scenario projects deflation in 2020, followed by several years of above-target inflation
during the recovery from the pandemic. We find that real wages fall by 0.9%.
We find that the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated structural differences in the UK labour market
as the pandemic has very different impacts on graduates compared to non-graduates. We project a large
surge in job losses, an additional 1.2 million job losses for non-graduates and an additional 400,000 job
losses for graduates.11 As a result, the unemployment rate of non-graduates rises to 10.1% compared to
6.8% for graduates. The real wage of non-graduates falls more than the real wage of graduates. These
effects unwind slowly over time; the structure of employment does not return to pre-pandemic levels
until 2024. The more severe impact of the pandemic on non-graduates arises because the more difficult
labour market environment for these workers is compounded by the differential impact of the pandemic,
as sectors that were especially severely impacted by the crisis, such as tourism and hospitality, employ
a larger proportion of lower qualification workers. We find that these two factors have roughly equal
importance in explaining the impact of the pandemic on less highly qualified workers.
Research into an ongoing event of the scale and rarity of the COVID-19 pandemic must be treated
with caution. In order to analyse the impact of the pandemic, this paper makes a series of strong
assumptions. First, our model does not allow for uncertainty. Second, our model tracks 11 distinct
labour market flows. This enables the model to capture some of the richness of the UK labour market,
but also makes the model complex. This complexity comes at a cost, as our model does not analyse
movements of workers in and out of self-employment or in and out of the labour force. Third, we assume
that the pandemic does not affect the steady-state of the UK economy; and that the pandemic does not
change structural relationships. Fourth, we assume it is appropriate to use a linearised version of the
model,12 even though the pandemic moves the economy some distance away from the steady-state.13
Further research that address the impact of the pandemic using alternative approaches would be useful.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Overview
The economy is composed of households, wholesale firms, retail firms, the government and the Central
Bank. Households are composed of two types of worker: graduates and non-graduates. There are two
types of goods and two types of firms. High productivity wholesale firms use graduates to produce
high productivity wholesale goods. They sell these to high productivity retail firms who use them
to produce high productivity retail goods, which they sell to households. Low productivity wholesale
firms use graduates and non-graduates to produce low productivity wholesale goods. They sell these
to low productivity retail firms who use them to produce low productivity retail goods, which are
sold to households. Wholesale goods markets are competitive but retail goods markets are imperfectly
competitive. The government collects taxes and purchases retail goods. The Central Bank sets the
interest rate on the financial asset, which households use to smooth consumption over time.
11This is consistent with evidence in Tomlinson (2020), who finds that job losses in 2020Q2 were concentrated in areas
such as Hospitality, Retail and Construction, with high proportions of employment of lower qualification workers. This is
partly offset by an increase in employment in the Health and Care sectors. By contrast, job losses in sectors with higher
concentrations of more highly qualified workers, such as Finance and Insurance and Public Administration are 5-6 times
lower.
12Our use of a linearisation is pragmatic. Our model comprises over 60 relationships, many of which are nonlinear.
Solving such a large nonlinear model is computationally impractical. Using a second-order expansion of such a large model
is also impractical.
13Subjecting our model to the large scale shocks that are required to mimic the impact of the pandemic puts our
simulations under stress; we find that values of vacancies and related labour market variables are highly volatile in the
early phase of the pandemic, as firms first cease hiring in 2020Q2-Q3 and then seek to rebuild their workforce once recovery
from the crisis begins.
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At the beginning of each period, workers search for jobs and vacancies are posted by wholesale firms
without a productive job match. This results in new job matches being formed, which become productive
in the same period. Next, wages are set and wholesale goods are produced. Then, job separation occurs.
Some employer-worker job matches survive and continue into the next period; other matches break down.
Separated workers enter the next period as unemployed and begin search for a new job then.14
3.2.2 The Labour Market
There are two types of workers: graduates Lg and non-graduates Lng. In the pre-pandemic period
Lg +Lng = L, where we use L = 1 as a normalisation. All graduates are identical and all non-graduates
are identical. During the pandemic, the number of graduates is Lgt = Lgeε
g
t and the number of non-
graduates is Lngt = Lngeε
ng
t , where εgt and ε
ng
t are shocks that capture the impact of the pandemic on
the workforce such as illness and hospitalisation due to coronavirus infection, and self-isolation.15
Graduates can be employed by high or low productivity wholesale firms, but non-graduates can only
be employed by low productivity wholesale firms. In any period, ugt graduates are unemployed, n
l,g
t are








Similarly, in any period, ungt non-graduates are unemployed and n
l,ng







Following production, job separation occurs, at rates τht and τ lt for high and low productivity firms
respectively. We assume that τ lt = τ leε
τl
t and τht = τheε
τh
t , τ l > τh, where ετ lt and ετ
h
t are shocks to the
rate of job destruction. The shocks will capture the wave of job losses induced by the pandemic.
We generate worker flows that match UK data through job search. All unemployed workers and
all employed workers search for jobs. Search for a job offered by a high productivity firm comes from
unemployed graduates, graduates employed by low productivity firms and from graduates employed by










t is search for high productivity jobs by unemployed graduates, who each search with
intensity ζh,g,u. sh,g,lt = ζh,g,ln
l,g
t is search by graduates employed by low productivity firms, who each
search for jobs at high productivity firms with intensity ζh,g,l. And sh,g,ht = ζh,g,hn
h,g
t is search by
graduates employed by high productivity firms, who each search with intensity ζh,g,h.
Search for a job offered by a low productivity firm comes from unemployed graduates and non-
graduates, from non-graduates employed by another low productivity firm, from graduates employed by
another low productivity firm, and from graduates employed by high productivity firms. So search for












14The Job Retention Scheme creates three choices for a firm: to continue a job match, to terminate it or to use a furlough.
The option of a furlough adds an additional layer of complexity to the analysis of endogenous job destruction. This is
beyond the scope of this paper, so we assume job destruction is exogenous.
15The shocks to the number of graduates and non-graduates due to the pandemic reflects the change in the size of
the labour force from workers transitioning into economic inactivity. Since the model does not include the economically









t are search for low productivity jobs by unemployed graduates









t are search by non-graduates employed by low productivity firms, search
by graduates employed by high productivity firms and search by graduates employed by low productivity
firms, who search for jobs with intensity ζl,ng,l, ζl,g,h and ζl,g,l respectively. Job search and worker flows
are summarised in Fig 3.1.
We assume that workers search with fixed intensity. This is in line with most of the recent literature,
including Faccini and Melosi (2020), Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2018b) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay
(2017), who model search by employed and unemployed workers in a one-sector model with identical
firms and workers. Leduc and Liu (2020) model variable search intensity in a one-sector model where
only unemployed workers can search for jobs and Gertler et al. (2020a) analyse a one-sector model in
which the productivity of a job match is randomly assigned to be high or low. The unemployed and
workers in high productivity jobs search with a fixed intensity, but workers looking to move up from a low
productivity match to a high productivity match search with varying intensity. In total, we use labour
market search to generate 11 distinct types of worker flows in our two-sector model. This complexity
makes consideration of variable search intensity impractical.
High productivity wholesale firms post vacancies vht . Only high qualification workers can be matched
to vacancies posted by high productivity firms. High productivity job matches are formed with the
matching function
hht = mh(vht )αh(sht )1−αh (3.5)
where mh is the high productivity matching efficiency and αh and 1−αh are elasticities. Job matches are
formed with unemployed graduates, graduates currently employed in low and high productivity firms,






t , where h
h,g,u
t is the number of unemployed graduates hired by high
productivity firms, hh,g,lt is the number of graduates employed in low productivity firms who find a new
job at a high productivity firm and hh,g,ht is the number of graduates employed in other high productivity
firms who find a new job at a high productivity firm. We assume that the proportion of hires from each



















so high productivity firms fill their vacancies at rate qht =
hht
vht
and the rate at which high qualification








ζh,g,ufht . Similarly, the job finding rates of graduates currently employed in low or high productivity
firms seeking work in high productivity firms are fh,g,lt =
hh,g,lt
nl,gt







Low productivity wholesale firms post vacancies vlt. Low productivity job matches are formed with
the matching function
hlt = ml(vlt)αl(slt)1−αl (3.7)
and ml is the high productivity matching efficiency and αl and 1− αl are elasticities. We again assume
that the proportion of hires from each source of hires depends on their relative search. The number
of unemployed non-graduates hired by low productivity firms is hl,ng,ut =
sl,ng,ut
slt


















































































































































































































































































































unemployed graduates hired by low productivity firms is hl,g,ut =
sl,g,ut
slt
hlt. The number of non-graduates













so low productivity firms fill their vacancies at rate qlt =
hlt
vlt
and the rate at which workers are matched
with a vacancy at a low productivity firm is f lt =
mlt
slt
. The job finding rates of unemployed graduates
and non-graduates seeking work in low productivity firms are f l,ng,ut =
hl,ng,ut
ungt





= ζl,g,uf lt respectively. And the job finding rates of non-graduates employed in low productivity









= ζl,g,hf lt respectively.
3.2.3 Households









where C is consumption, η is the intertemporal elasticity of consumption and eεd is a preference shock.
We assume that εd < 0 during the pandemic and its aftermath.
As discussed below, all graduates in high productivity jobs earn the same real wage, wht and all
workers, graduates and non-graduates, in low productivity jobs earn the same real wage, wlt. The budget





t + Ptwht n
h,g
t + Ptbut +Bt−1 + Πt − Tt = PtCt + P bt Bt (3.10)
where P is the consumption price index, ut = ungt + u
g
t is the number of unemployed workers, nlt =
nl,gt +n
l,ng
t is the number of workers employed by low productivity firms, b is the real opportunity cost of
employment, comprising the value of leisure and unemployment benefit, P b = 11+i is the nominal price of
bonds, Π is the profit the household receives for the ownership of firms and Tt is a lump-sum tax levied
on the household by the government.
The household chooses consumption and bond purchases to maximise utility subject to their budget


















The household derives utility from consuming both high productivity retail goods and low produc-
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where Ch is consumption of high productivity retail goods, Cl is consumption of low productivity retail
goods and ν is the elasticity of substitution between them. Γht is the proportion of household consumption
that is of high productivity retail goods and Γht = Γheε
Γh
t , where εΓht is a shock to the preference for
high productivity retail goods relative to low productivity retail goods. We use this shock in modelling
the impact of the pandemic on the demand for different types of goods. The implied price index is
Pt =
[
Γht (Pht )1−ν + (1− Γht )(P lt )1−ν
] 1
1−ν (3.14)
where Pht is the price index for high productivity retail goods and P lt is the price index for low productivity












Household consumption of high productivity retail goods is a composite of individual high produc-








νh−1 , where Chj is household consumption of high
productivity retail good j and νh is the elasticity of substitution between high productivity goods. The







1−νh where Phj is the price of
high productivity retail good j.
Similarly, household consumption of low productivity retail goods is a composite of individual low








νl−1 , where Clj is household consumption of
low productivity retail good j and νl is the elasticity of substitution between low productivity goods.







1−νl where P lj is the price of low productivity
retail good j.
Households purchase high productivity retail good j from the retail firm in the high productivity






Similarly, households purchase low productivity retail good j from the retail firm in the low productivity






3.2.4 The Central Bank and Aggregate Demand
Aggregate demand equals aggregate output17
Yt = Ct (3.19)
17An alternative formulation of this Yt = Ct + γhvht + γlvlt, where γh and γl are the costs of posting a vacancy for high
and low productivity firms, respectively. In our simulations, the increased volatility of vacancies in 2020Q2 and 202Q3
distorts this relationship, leading to unreliable results.
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We assume that the Central Bank sets the interest rate using the simple Taylor rule
it = i+ φππt + φy ŷt + εit (3.20)
where ŷ is the output gap and εit is a monetary policy shock.
3.2.5 Wholesale Firms
High Productivity Wholesale Firms
All high productivity wholesale firms are competitive and identical. There is no rigidity in wholesale
prices, so all high productivity wholesale firms set the same price. The objective function of the high
















where Y h,W is output, Ph,W is the price of the output of high productivity wholesale firms, Ph is the
price of the output of high productivity retail firms and γh is the cost of posting a vacancy for high
productivity firms. The production function is
Y h,Wt = Aht n
h,g
t (3.22)
where Aht = Aheε
sh
t , where εsht is a shock to the productivity of workers at high productivity firms.
εs
h
t < 0 during the pandemic, as some employed workers will be furloughed under the Job Retention
Scheme and others will be working from home, where they are less productive. Considering the evolution
of employment, nh,gt graduates are employed and used in production in period t. Following production,
τht n
h,g





move to other high productivity firms and f l,g,ht+1 n
h,g
t move to a low productivity firm. The firm posts




t+1 , the evolution
of employment for the high productivity wholesale firm is therefore
nht+1 = ρht nht + qht+1vht+1 (3.23)
The firm chooses the number of vacancies to post to maximise (3.21) subject to (3.22) and (3.23).
The optimality condition is
∂Jht+1
∂vht+1



































− wht + ρhtEtβt,t+1 γqht+1 , the optimality condition implies
Aht
µh
= wht + λht (3.25)






assumption that high productivity wholesale firms are in perfect competition, the job creation condition





the marginal cost, where the marginal cost is the sum of the wage and the marginal hiring cost.
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Low Productivity Wholesale Firms
Low productivity wholesale firms employ both graduates and non-graduates, so employment is nlt =
nl,gt +n
l,ng
t . Due to a legal or fairness constraint, all workers employed at the firm must be paid the same
















where Y l,W is output, P l,W is the price of the output of low productivity wholesale firms, P l is the price
of the output of low productivity retail firms and γl is the cost of posting a vacancy for low productivity
firms. The production function is
Y l,Wt = Altnlt (3.27)
where Alt = Aleε
sl
t , and εslt is a shock to the productivity of workers at low productivity firms; we assume
that graduates and non-graduates are equally productive in the low productivity employment. εslt < 0
during the pandemic, due to some employed workers being furloughed and others working from home.
The evolution of employment at low productivity firms reflect the different evolutions of employment
of graduates and non-graduates. Considering graduate employment, nl,gt workers are employed and used
in production in period t. Following this, τ ltn
l,g





move to high productivity firms and f l,g,lt+1 n
l,g
t workers move to other low productivity firms. The firm




t+1 new graduates. Defining ρ
l,g















Following similar arguments, the evolution of non-graduate employment at the representative low pro-










where ρl,ngt = 1− τ lt − f
l,ng,l























nlt+1 = ρltnlt + qltvlt (3.31)









The firm chooses the number of vacancies to post to maximise(3.26) subject to (3.27) and (3.31).
The optimality condition is
∂J lt+1
∂vlt+1












− wlt + ρltEtβt,t+1
∂Jlt+1
∂nlt+1




















− wlt + ρltEtβt,t+1 γ
l
qlt+1
, the optimality condition implies
Alt
µl
= wlt + λlt (3.33)
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In this model, wages are determined through wage bargaining, with real wage rigidity, where we model
real wage rigidity following Faia (2008) and Krause and Lubik (2007).18 We also model the impact of a
temporary wage subsidy due to the Job Retention Scheme, which we treat as a shock. The wage paid
by high productivity firms is





where wb,ht is the wage implied by bargaining, wh is the steady-state value of this wage, ϕh captures real
wage rigidity and εwh is the wage subsidy. The wage received by workers employed in high productivity
firms is
wh,wt = ϕhwh + (1− ϕh)w
b,h
t (3.35)
The bargained wage is chosen to maximise





where Sh,gt is the surplus to the household from an additional worker being employed in a high produc-
tivity firm, Fht is the surplus to the firm and ζh is the bargaining power of graduates in high productivity
jobs. This gives the sharing rule
(1− ζh)Sh,gt = ζhFht (3.37)





Aht + γhζh,g,uEtθht+1 + γlζl,g,uEtθlt+1
}
+ (1− ζh)b (3.38)
As shown in (3.38), market tightness in both sectors impact the high productivity sector bargained
wage. This comes from the ability of graduates to fill either high or low productivity sector job posi-
tions. In the absence of the low productivity sector or mobility between sectors, graduates would be
employed in the high productivity sector and unemployed otherwise; so (3.38) reflects that for one less
unemployed graduate, the household receives value from an additional graduate employed in the high
productivity sector ζh,g,uEtθht+1, who also had the opportunity of employment in the low productivity
sector ζl,g,uEtθlt+1.
The wage for high productivity wholesale firms is therefore determined by (3.34) and (3.38).
Using a similar notation, the wage paid by low productivity firms is





and the wage received by workers employed in low productivity firms is
wl,wt = ϕlwl + (1− ϕl)w
b,l
t (3.40)
Graduates in low productivity employment have the same productivity as non-graduates, and for fairness
18A major weakness of the Mortensen-Pissarides search model is the inability of the model to match business cycle
fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies. The standard search model predicts excess volatility in the real wage, and
little employment response. This drawback is resolved by the introduction of wage rigidities into the model (see for example
Pissarides (2009) and Shimer (2005) for discussion.). Given the number of shocks in our model, we assume that there is
real wage rigidity, so that the volatility in the real wages does not suppress the employment response in the model. Our
assumption of real wage rigidity is also consistent with the data on UK wages (see, for example, Babecky et al. (2010) and
Holden and Wulfsberg (2009)).
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and legal constraints, we assume that both types of worker in low productivity employment must be paid
the same wage. However, a match with a non-graduate has a different value to a low productivity firm
than a match with a graduate. This is because graduates can transition to high productivity employment,
but non-graduates cannot, so the low productivity match with a graduate has a lower probability of
contiunation than a match with a non-graduate. Therefore, we assume that wage bargaining only takes
place between the firm and non-graduates. The bargained wage is determined by the sharing rule
(1− ζl)Sl,ngt = ζlF lt (3.41)
where Sl,ngt is the surplus to the household from an additional non-graduate being employed in a low
productivity firm, F lt is the surplus to the firm and ζl is the bargaining power of non-graduates in the







+ (1− ζl)b (3.42)
In this case, there is no mobility between sectors for non-graduates. This means that the opportunity
cost to the household for an unemployed non-graduate is an employed non-graduate earning a wage
which is a function of their search intensity and the low productivity sector market tightness alone.
3.2.7 Retail Firms
High Productivity Retail Firms
High productivity retail firms produce differentiated high productivity retail goods, which they sell to
households. High productivity retail firms face a downward sloping demand curve and determine the
price of their output, acting as monopolistic competitors. High productivity retail firms purchase high
productivity wholesale goods in a competitive market and transform these costlessly into a differentiated
high productivity retail good.
The production function for the high productivity retail firm is
Y ht = Y
h,W
t (3.43)
where Y h,W is the amount of high productivity wholesale goods purchased by the high productivity
retail firm. High productivity sector retail firms can adjust their price in each period with probability
































is the price of the high productivity intermediate good and µh = νh
νh−1 is the
markup, high productivity retail firms set their price as a markup on their marginal cost.
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High productivity retail firms that are unable to reset their price maintain their past optimal price
indexed for inflation. This is consistent with the price setting rule
Pht = (1− ωh)P
∗h
t + ωhπht−1Pht−1 (3.47)
Taking the log deviation of (4.41) and the price setting rule around a zero inflation steady state gives
the Phillips Curve for the high productivity sector
πht =
1






1 + β π
h
t+1 (3.48)




Low productivity Retail Firms
Similarly, each low productivity retail firm produces a differentiated low productivity retail good, which
it sells to households. Each low productivity retail firm faces a downward sloping demand curve and
determines the price of their output, acting as a monopolistic competitor. Each low productivity retail
firm purchases wholesale low productivity goods in a competitive market and transforms these costlessly
into a differentiated low productivity retail good. Following the same argument as for high productivity
retail firms, we obtain the price setting rule
P lt = (1− ωl)P
∗l














is the price of the low productivity intermediate good and µl = νl
νl−1 . Taking the log
deviation of (3.50) and (3.49) around a zero steady state gives the Phillips Curve
πlt =
1






1 + β π
l
t+1 (3.51)





There are no similar studies of the UK labour market that distinguish between different types of workers.
We therefore first construct a series of calibration targets. The most recent data on graduates in the UK
labour market is for 2017 (ONS (2017a)). We assume that the UK labour market was in steady-state,
relative to the impact of the pandemic, in that year. In 2017, 42% of the population aged 21-64 were
graduates; so we set Lg = 0.42 and hence Lng = 0.58. The unemployment rate of graduates in that
year was 3%, so ugLg = 0.03. This implies that unemployed graduates as a fraction of the labour force
ug = ugLg
Lg
L = 0.013. Since the workforce is normalised to 1, the unemployment rate is u = ug + ung.
The unemployment rate in 2017 was 4.3%, so ung = 0.043 − 0.013 = 0.030. Employment of graduates
was ng = Lg − ug = 0.407. In 2017, 36.3% of employed graduates were in non-graduate occupations
(ONS (2017a)). So we use nh,g = 0.407 ∗ (1− 0.363) = 0.26 and nl,g = 0.407 ∗ 0.363 = 0.15 as calibration
targets. Employment of non-graduates was nl,ng = Lng − ung = 0.55; we also target this value.
We target the wage in high productivity occupations relative to the wage in low productivity occupa-
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tions. To construct this, we follow ONS practice and define a high productivity job as corresponding to
groups 1)-3) in the UK Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) (ONS (2009)): “Managers, directors
& senior officials”, “Professional occupations” and “Associate professional & technical”. We assume that
high productivity firms only employ graduates in these occupations. We define a low productivity job
as corresponding to groups 4)-9):19 “Administrative & secretarial”, “Skilled trades”, “Caring, leisure
& other services”, “Sales & customer services, “Process, plant & machine operatives” and “Elementary
occupations”. We assume that all workers are able to occupy these roles. Using ONS data for 2017 on em-
ployment by occupation (ONS (2017a)) and weekly earnings by occupation (ONS (2017b)), we calculated
that the average wage in high productivity occupations exceeds that in low productivity occupations by
190%. We target this in our calibrations.
For the rate of job destruction, we use data from the 2017 UK Labour Force Survey. This gives annual
rates of job destruction for different occupations. We match these occupations to the UK SOC and use
this to construct job survival rates for high and low productivity occupations. We obtain ρh = 0.92 and
ρl = 0.88 as annual rates. In our calibration, we assume that a time period corresponds to one quarter.
We use ρh = 0.98 and ρl = 0.97 as our quarterly calibration targets.
We construct calibration targets for job flows using data on flows of workers between employment
and unemployment and between employment in different occupations. In steady-state, hires of graduates
into the high productivity sector are hh,g = ρhnh,g = 0.005. These hires can come from workers in the
high or low productivity sectors, or from unemployment. To calculate these flows, we used ONS data
on job to job moves by skill level in 2017 (ONS (2017c)) to construct measures of job movements within
the high productivity sector and of hires into the high productivity sector from the low productivity
sector. We also combined data on total hires from unemployment (ONS (2020c)) with estimates of the
percentage of hires from unemployment that went to the high productivity sector (ONS (2016a))20 to
construct a measure of hires into the high productivity sector from unemployment. This gave the relative
sizes of the various flows into the high productivity sector: 28% of hires by high productivity firms came
from unemployed graduates, 55% were from workers employed at other high productivity firms and 17%
were hired from low productivity firms.
Using a similar approach, the number of graduates hired into the low productivity sector is hl,g =
ρlnl,g = 0.004. These hires can come from workers in the high or low productivity sectors, or from
unemployment. We obtain the number hired from the high productivity sector using ONS job-to-job
flow data (ONS (2017c)). To find the number hired from the low productivity sector, we obtained the
share of graduates in the low productivity sector as nl,g
nl,g+nl,ng = 0.211 and assumed that the share
of graduates in hires into the low productivity sector was equal to this, so hl,g,l
hl,g,l+hl,ng,l = 0.211. We
combined this with data on job moves within the low productivity sector to obtain hires of graduates in
the low productivity sector from elsewhere in that sector. We obtained estimates of hires of graduates
into the low productivity sector from unemployment by combining our estimate of hires into the low
productivity sector from unemployment with the assumption that the share on graduates in these hires
matched their share in low productivity employment. Using all these data, we find that 27% of hires of
graduates by low productivity firms came from unemployment, 43% were from workers employed at high
productivity firms and 31% were hired from other low productivity firms. Using a similar approach to
estimate hires of non-graduates into the low productivity sector, we find the number of non-graduates
hired into the low productivity sector is hl,ng = ρlnl,ng = 0.016. Of these, 46% of hires of non-graduates
by low productivity firms came from unemployment and 54% were hired from other low productivity
firms. This evidence shows that only a minority of new hires come from the unemployed, highlighting
the importance of modelling job-to-job flows in the UK labour market.
19The ONS classifies groups 4-6 as medium skill and groups 7-9 as low skill.
20This measure should be treated with caution as it is for London only.
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This gives a total of 20 calibration targets, outlined in Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Calibration Targets
Steady-State Value Interpretation Target Source This Model
ug Graduate Unemployment Rate 0.013 ONS data 0.018
ung Non-Graduate Unemployment Rate 0.030 ONS data 0.030
nh,g Emp of Graduates in High Productivity Firms 0.26 ONS data 0.26
nl,g Emp of Graduates in Low Productivity Firms 0.15 ONS data 0.15
nl,ng Emp of non-Graduates in Low Productivity Firms 0.55 ONS data 0.56
wh
wl
Relative Wage 1.90 ONS data 1.98
ρh Match Continuation in High Productivity Firms 0.98 LFS data 0.99
ρl Match Continuation in Low Productivity Firms 0.97 LFS data 0.98
hh,g Hires of Graduates Into High Productivity Firms 0.005 authors calculation 0.003
hl,g Hires of Graduates Into Low Productivity Firms 0.004 authors calculation 0.003
hl,ng Hires of Non-Graduates Into Low Productivity Firms 0.016 authors calculation 0.015
hh,g,u
hh,g
Share of Hires of Graduates by High from U 28% authors calculation 41%
hh,g,h
hh,g
Share of Hires of Graduates by High from High 55% authors calculation 33%
hh,g,l
hh,g
Share of Hires of Graduates by High from Low 17% authors calculation 26%
hl,g,u
hl,g
Share of Hires of Graduates by Low from U 27% authors calculation 34%
hl,g,h
hl,g
Share of Hires of Graduates by Low from High 43% authors calculation 46%
hl,g,l
hl,g
Share of Hires of Graduates by Low from Low 31% authors calculation 20%
hl,ng,u
hl,ng
Share of Hires of Non-Graduates by Low from U 46% authors calculation 48%
hl,ng,l
hl,ng
Share of Hires of Non-Graduates by Low from Low 54% authors calculation 52%
Y Aggregate Output 1 normalisation 0.98
Our model comprises 35 parameters. As discussed above, we calibrate Lg = 0.42. We use the calibra-
tions and estimates in Faccini et al. (2013) for the UK wherever a parameter of our model corresponds
to a similar parameter in that study. Specifically, we follow Faccini et al. (2013) in setting the discount
factor as r = 0.101, the opportunity cost of employment as b = 0.58, 21 the coefficient of risk aversion
in utility as η = 0.73 and the responses of monetary policy to inflation and the output gap as φπ = 1.48
and φy = 0.31 respectively. We also assume the elasticities of matching with respect to unemployment
for both high and low productivity firms are the same and set them to the elasticity in the aggregate
matching function in Faccini et al. (2013), so αh = αh = 0.3. We assume νl = 11. We also calibrate
the bargaining power of workers in wage setting in the high productivity firms using the corresponding
bargaining power in the aggregate wage bargain in Faccini et al. (2013), so ζh = 0.87. For the param-
eters of the wage- and price-setting relationships, we follow a model developed by the Office of Budget
Responsibility (Murray (2012)) and set κh = κl = 0.1 and ωh = ωl = 0.85. In the absence of previous
calibrations for the UK, we set ϕh = ϕl = 0.95.
We calibrate the remaining 19 parameters to match our 20 calibration targets as closely as possible.
We set the weight on high productivity retail goods in household utility as ν = 2. We set the exogenous
job destruction rates in high and low productivity firms as τh = 0.001 and τ l = 0.0125, respectively. This
21The calibration of the model implies steady state values for the high and low productivity wage to be 1.42 and 0.72
respectively, and an average wage of 0.88. So we assume that the opportunity cost of employment is sufficiently low that
workers would always choose to be employed.
38
3. Modelling the Differing Impacts of COVID-19 in the UK Labour Market
implies that job matches in high productivity firms are much more likely to be terminated as the result
of workers moving to other jobs than by workers moving to unemployment. We set the bargaining power
of workers in wage setting in low productivity firms as ζl = 0.4, so workers at low productivity firms
have less than half the bargaining power of workers at high productivity firms. We set mh = 2.2 and
ml = 0.98. The costs of posting vacancies are calibrated as γh = 0.4 and γl = 0.24. The productivities of
workers in high and low productivity firms are set as Ah = 1.5 and Al = 0.80 respectively, so workers at
high productivity firms are almost twice as productive as workers at low productivity firms. We assume
νh = 20. Finally, we calibrate the various search intensities as ζh,g,u = 0.26, ζl,g,u = 0.14, ζl,ng,u = 0.38,
ζh,g,h = 0.009, ζh,g,l = 0.007, ζl,g,h = 0.006, ζl,g,l = 0.004 and ζl,ng,l = 0.013. These calibrations are
summarised in Table 3.2). As the final column of Table 3.1) shows, our parameter calibration enables
us to match our calibration targets closely, although the match is less close for the complex pattern of
transitions of workers between unemployment and between different jobs.
Our calibration implies that graduates find it more difficult to find employment than non-graduates,
as fh,g = 0.13 and f l,g = 0.14 in steady-state, compared with f l,ng = 0.41. High productivity firms fill
their vacancies at a faster rate, as qh = 2.01, compared to ql = 0.89. Although it is more costly for high
productivity firms to post vacancies, since γh > γl, the marginal cost of hiring workers is lower for high
productivity firms, since λh
Ah
= 0.003, compared to λl
Al
= 0.012, reflecting the faster rate at which high
productivity firms fill their vacancies and the higher rate of job destruction at low productivity firms.
Table 3.2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Source/Target Value
Lg % Graduates in Labour Force ONS data 0.420
r Discount Rate Faccini et al (2013) 0.0101
φπ Mon Pol Response to Inflation Faccini et al (2013) 1.48
φy Mon Pol Response to Output Faccini et al (2013) 0.31
b Opp Cost of Employment Faccini et al (2013) 0.58
η Risk Aversion Faccini et al (2013) 0.73
αh Matching Elasticity for High Prod Faccini et al (2013) 0.3
αl Matching Elasticity for Low Prod Faccini et al (2013) 0.3
νl Elasticity of Demand for Low Prod Faccini et al (2013) 11
ζh Bargaining Power for High Prod Faccini et al (2013) 0.87
ν % Weight on High Prod Goods in Utility Authors’ Calibration 2
τh Exog Job Destuction in High Productivity Firms Authors’ Calibration 0.0011
τ l Exog Job Destuction in Low Productivity Firms Authors’ Calibration 0.0125
mh Matching Efficiency for High Productivity Firms Authors’ Calibration 2.15
ml Matching Efficiency for Low Productivity Firms Authors’ Calibration 0.8
ζl Bargaining Power for Low Productivity Firms Authors’ Calibration 0.4
νh Elasticity of Demand for High Prod Authors’ Calibration 20
γh Vacancy Cost for High Productivity Firms Authors’ Calibration 0.4
γl Vacancy Cost for Low Productivity Firms Authors’ Calibration 0.24
Ah Productivity for High Productivity Firms Authors’ Calibration 1.5
Al Productivity for Low Productivity Firms Authors’ Calibration 0.80
ζh,g,u Search by Unemp Grads for High Prod Jobs Authors’ Calibration 0.1
ζl,g,u Search by Unemp Grads for Low Prod Jobs Authors’ Calibration 0.13
ζl,ng,u Search by Unemp Non-Grads for Low Prod Jobs Authors’ Calibration 0.355
continued . . .
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. . . continued
Parameter Interpretation Source/Target Value
ζh,g,h Search by High Prod Grads for Other High Prod Jobs Authors’ Calibration 0.005
ζh,g,l Search by Low Prod Grads for High Prod Jobs Authors’ Calibration 0.0025
ζl,g,h Search by High Prod Grads for Low Prod Jobs Authors’ Calibration 0.007
ζl,g,l Search by Low Prod Grads for Other Low Prod Jobs Authors’ Calibration 0.0034
ζl,ng,l Search by Low Prod Non-Grads for Other Low Prod Jobs Authors’ Calibration 0.015
3.4 Modelling the Pandemic
3.4.1 Modelling the Pandemic Using Shocks
We model the COVID-19 pandemic and the policy measures taken to mitigate this as a series of si-
multaneous shocks. To model the impact of these, we write the linearised representation of our model
as
A0E0Xk+1 = A1Xk +A2Xk−1 +Bεpank (3.52)
for k = 1, 2, 3..., where k is the number or quarters since the pandemic began, Xk is an (n×1) vector
containing the n endogenous variables of the model; εpank is a (s× 1) vector containing the s shocks that
we use to represent the pandemic and policy measures; A0, A1 and A2 are (n × n) matrices containing
the structural parameters of the model, calibrated as decribed in the previous section; and B is an (n×s)
matrix that captures the impact of the shocks on the endogenous variables. To simulate the pandemic,
we first specify the shocks in εpan, as described below. We assume the pandemic began in 2020Q2, when
k = 1; we assume the UK economy was in steady-state (relative to the major disruption that followed)
in 2020Q1. We use a deterministic simulation of the model, showing the response of the endogenous
variables to the shocks in εpan. We model the shocks as autoregressive processes, so
εzt+k = ρzεzt+k−1 (3.53)
where z indexes the shock; so the behaviour of the shock over time is characterised by the incidence
in 2020Q2 and the persistence parameter. We begin by specifying a baseline simulation to show the
likely impact over 2020-2023, based on information available in June 2020. We then consider alternative
scenarios.
Considering how to model the shocks, we first note that the pandemic has reduced the number of
workers. Although fatalities had a larger impact on non-graduates, with the mortality for the top three
occupational groups substantially below that for other groups, the distribution of self isolation has been
more even (ONS (2020a)). The pandemic has also reduced aggregate demand, with sharp reductions
in consumer spending and a a large reduction in the demand for consumer credit. There has been a
marked reduction in consumer confidence. The impact on this has fallen more heavily on areas with
a higher proportion of non-graduates, especially leisure, hospitality and entertainment. The pandemic
has also led to a surge in job destruction, with almost two million additional claims for Universal Credit
between mid-March and the first week of April (DWP (2020)); this was concentrated in non-graduate
occupations. In addition, the pandemic has led to a rapid increase in the numbers working at home.
Home working is heavily concentrated among graduates (Costa Dias et al. (2020)), with 47% of graduates
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working at home in late April 2020, compared to around 15% of those with no qualifications (Gustafsson
and McCurdy (2020)); related to this, over 50% of workers in managerial and professional occupations
were working from home, compared to less than 10% in personal services, process and machine operatives
and elementary occupations (ibid). Reflecting this, we model the pandemic as a combination of shocks:
(i) εg < 0 and εng < 0, with εng < εg; (ii) εd < 0; (iii) εΓh > 0; (iv) ετh > 0 and ετ l > 0, with ετ l > ετh ;
and (v) εsh < 0 and εsl < 0, with εsl < εsh . These assumptions are sumarised in the first row of Table
3.3).
The public health response to the pandemic was a “lockdown”, leading to the temporary closure of
many workplaces and all shops, public spaces and schools, to restrict movements outside the home. We
model this as a reduction in aggregate demand, with a larger impact on low productivity firms, reflecting
the widespread closure of much of the entertainment and hospitality sectors;22 also an increase in the
rate of job destruction, with again a disproportionate effect on lower productivity firms; and a reduction
in the productivity of workers, with a larger impact on the lower productivity sector, due to lower rates
of home working. So we assume (i) εd < 0; (ii) εΓh > 0; (iii) ετh > 0 and ετ l > 0, with ετ l > ετh ; and
(iv) εsh < 0 and εsl < 0, with εsl < εsh . These assumptions are summarised in the second row of Table
3.3).
The adverse effects of these measures were to some extent offset by the Job Retention Scheme.
Through this, the UK Treasury covered 80% of the cost of furloughed workers, up to a limit of £30,000
(slightly above 2019 UK annual median earnings of £29,400). By early May 2020, two thirds of UK
firms had applied to the scheme and close to 7.5 million workers were on furlough. Take up was heavily
skewed towards workers in lower productivity occupations (Leslie (2020)). The large number of workers
on furlough preserved job matches and so reduced the rate of job destruction. By supporting the incomes
of workers who would otherwise become unemployed, the Scheme also boosted aggregate demand. But
the withdrawal of large numbers of employed workers from work led to a large decline in productivity.
So we model a “Job Retention Scheme” as (i) εd > 0; (ii) ετh < 0 and ετ l < 0, with ετ l > ετh ; (iii)
εs
h
< 0 and εsh < 0, with εsh < εsh ; and (iv) εwl < 0 and εwh < 0, with εwl < εwh . These assumptions
are summarised in the third row of Table 3.3).
Other governmental responses to the pandemic also had a significant effect on the impact of the
pandemic on the economy. In particular, there were large increases in state expenditure on health care,
and large increases in Local Authority funding, used to finance a rapid transfer of patients from hospital
into care homes, to make room for the rapid expansion in NHS capacity late March 2020, deferrals of VAT
and other tax payments; the direct impact of these policy measures on cash borrowing in 2020-21 was
forecast by the Office of Budget Responsibility in May 2020 to be £123 billion (OBR (2020)). We model
the effect of this as an increase in aggregate demand and an increase in hiring in the low productivity
sector reflecting the higher proportion of jobs requiring non-graduates in the health and care sectors,
that offset some of the loss of jobs in low productivity firms, so (i) εd > 0 and (ii) ετ l < 0. These effects
are summarised in the fourth row of Table 3.3).
A strong monetary policy response from the Bank of England provided an additional mitigation to
the adverse economic effects of the pandemic. From mid-March 2020, the Bank of England increased the
size and scope of it’s Quantitative Easing (QE) program, announcing additional purchases of £435bn,
alongside other measures to support the financial system and to encourage lending (BoE (2020b)). We
model the impact of this as a negative shock to the interest rate, so εi < 0. These effects are summarised
in the fifth row of Table 3.3).
22This response is consistent with the prescient simulation in Keogh-Brown et al. (2009).
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Table 3.3: The Impact of the Pandemic and Mitigating Policies via Shocks







Pandemic ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓
Public Health ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓
JRS ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Fiscal Policy ↑ ↓
Monetary Policy ↓
3.4.2 Calibration of the Pandemic Shocks
We can classify the shocks in our simulation as being either aggregate supply or aggregate demand shocks,
where the former comprise shocks to the workforce, to job destruction, to productivity and to wages.
Aggregate demand shocks comprise shocks to monetary policy, to relative demand and to aggregate
demand. Considering the aggregate supply shocks first, the main impact of the pandemic on the size
of the workforce arose from workers being in self-isolation or sick with COVID-19. The impact of the
pandemic on mortality of prime-age individuals in the UK was relatively limited, short in duration and
mainly affected workers in health, care and transport occupations (ONS (2020b)). At the height of the
pandemic in April 2020, 3% of workers were affected in this way, with a fairly even incidence across
industries (Costa Dias et al. (2020)). So we calibrate εgt and ε
ng
t to generate a 3% reduction in Lg
and Lng; we assume that this effect dissipates rapidly, reflecting the strong impact of the lock-down in
reducing infection rates, by assumng ρg = ρng = 0.05. In this simulation, we assume there is no “second
wave” of infections.23
Information on the distribution of job losses by occupation is scarce at the time of writing. But the
Resolution Foundation estimated job losses by industry in April 2020 (Tomlinson (2020)), finding that
these are concentrated in areas such as Hospitality, Retail and Construction, with high proportions of
employment of non-graduates. This is partly offset by an increase in employment in the Health and
Care sectors. By contrast, job losses in sectors with higher concentrations of graduates, such as Finance
and Insurance and Public Administration, are 5-6 times lower. Based on this evidence, we calibrate ετ lt
so that the rate of exogenous job destruction in low productivity firms increases to 6.7% at the onset
of the crisis. This generates an increase of 1.2 million non-graduates and 200,000 graduates becoming
unemployed. We calibrate ετht so that the rate of exogenous job destruction in high productivity firms
increases to 2.9% in 2020Q2; this generates an additional flow of 200,000 newly unemployed graduates.
We assume ρτ l = ρτh = 0.5, so the wave of job losses dies away quite rapidly. Together, these shocks
lead to an additional 1.6 million job losses at the onset of the pandemic.24
To construct the supply shocks for the representative high productivity firms, we define the effective








t are the proportions of
workers at high priductivity firms who are furloughed and working from home respectively, and πwfh,h
and πwfh,h are the relative productivities of these workers. Since output is Y ht = Aht n
h,e
t , output per






= (1 − πf,hωf,ht − πwfh,hω
wfh,h
t )Aht . We assume that furloughed workers
do not contribute to output, so πwfh = 0 and that working from home reduces productivity by 10%,
23Coibion et al. (2020) have suggested that the pandemic led to the withdrawal of workers from the workforce in the US.
The surge in job search activity by new claimants for Universal Credit suggests this effect is small in the UK, Brewer and
Handscomb (2020).
24This is somewhat above the number of new claims for Universal Credit in this period, but not all workers are eligible
for Universal Credit.
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so πwfh = 0.9. We use occupational-level data on the numbers of workers furloughed and working at
home in April 2020, constructed by Gustafsson and McCurdy (2020). Using ONS data on employment by
occupation, we use these data to construct measures of the share of workers employed in high productivity
firms who were furloughed or working from home in April 2020. We adjusted the numbers furloughed
to reflect increased take-up of the Job Retention Scheme (JRS) until June 2020, to get estimates for
2020Q2;25 we find that over 2020Q2, an average of 19.4% of workers at high productivity firms were
furloughed, so ωf,ht = 0.194, and 51.5% of workers at high productivity firms worked from home, so
ωwfh,ht = 0.515. Productivity per employed worker at high productivity firms in 2020Q2 is then (100-
19.4-0.1*51.5)=75.5% of the pre-pandemic level. We calibrate the high productivity supply shock so
that eεs
h
t = (1 − πf,hωf,ht − πwfh,hω
wfh,h
t ) matches this figure. We also find that over 2020Q2, an
average of 21% of workers at low productivity firms were furloughed and 17% were working from home.
Productivity per employed worker at the representative low productivity firm in 2020Q2 is then (100-
21.4-0.1*17)=77.1% of the pre-pandemic level. We calibrate the low productivity supply shock to match
this. We assume ρsh = ρsl = 0.25.
To calculate the impact of the Job Retention Scheme on wages, we first consider the representative
low productivity firm. We express the wages paid by this firm as {ωf,lt (1− φ
f,l
t ) + (1− ω
f,l
t )}wlt, where
φf,lt is the share of the wage paid by the state under the JRS. The Job Retention Scheme paid 80% of the
wages of furloughed workers, up to a limit of £30,000, close to the median wage; so we assume φf,lt = 0.8.
This implies that the wage cost to the representative low productivity firm is 21*0.2+79 or 83.2% of the
wage. We calibrate the wage shock for low productivity firms to match this. We express the wages paid




t )}wht , where φ
f,h
t is the share of
the wage paid by the state under the JRS. The calculation here is less straightforward since the wage in
these firms will be above the median. Here we assume that the JRS pays 40% of the wage, so φf,lt = 0.4.
This implies that the wage cost to the representative high productivity firm is 19.4*0.6+80.6 or 92.2%
of the wage. We calibrate the wage shock for high productivity firms to match this. Reflecting the short
duration of the JRS, we assume ρwh = ρwl = 0.15.
To model the impacts of the pandemic on aggregate demand, we calibrate εi so that the (shadow)
interest rate decreases by 250 basis points in 2020Q2; we assume ρi = 0.75, so this effect is relatively
persistent. Initial estimates of GDP for April 2020 suggest much sharper falls in output in hospitality
and retail industries, with a lower fall in output that makes greater use of graduates. To model this, we
calibrate εΓh so that the fall in demand for the output of high productivity firms is 25% smaller than
the fall in demand for the output of low productivity firms. Finally, we calibrate the aggregate demand
shock εd to match the projected reduction in UK GDP in June 2020. Here, there is little consensus. The
May 2020 Bank of England Monetary Policy Report projects a reduction of 14% in the main illustrative
baseline scenario (BoE (2020a)). The OECD expects a falls of 11.4% (OECD (2020)), while the IMF
projects a fall of 10.2% (IMF (2020)). We calibrate εd to generate a fall in UK GDP over 2020 of 11%.
Table 3.4: The Baseline and Alternative Scenario
Impact (i) Baseline (ii) Scenario 1
Lg ↓ 3% ↓ 3%
Lng ↓ 3% ↓ 3%
τh ↑ 168% ↑ 168%
τ l ↑ 335% ↑ 168%
continued . . .
25The number of workers furloughed using the JRS increased from 3.8 million in April 2020 to 8.9 million in June 2020.
For 2020Q2 as a whole, we used the average of these figures. We assumed that the numbers working from home did not
change between April-June 2020.
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. . . continued
Impact (i) Baseline (ii) Scenario 1
Ah ↓ 24.5% ↓ 24.5%
Al ↓ 22.9% ↓ 24.5%
wh ↓ 7.8% ↓ 7.8%
wl ↓ 17.0% ↓ 7.8%




Y d ↓ 11.0% ↓ 11.0%
3.4.3 Baseline Scenario
The calibration of shocks in our baseline simulation, as outlined above, are contained in column (i) of
Table 3.4). The results of our baseline simulation is shown in Figure 3.2). We begin by considering
the aggregate impacts. Our model projects a relatively quick recovery in output, which returns to pre-
pandemic levels by mid-2021. The recovery in other variables is slower. Unemployment increases to
2.97 million workers, an unemployment rate of 8.7%, by 2020Q3; this is close to the forecast of 9%
in the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Report of May 2020 (BoE (2020a)). The recovery in the
unemployment rate is slow; it does not return to pre-pandemic levels until 2022. Employment falls by
6.6% by the end of 2020 and remains below pre-pandemic values until 2021. The real wage falls by 0.9%;
this recovers quickly and exceeds the pre-pandemic level by early 2022.26 Our scenario projects deflation
of -2% in 2020, followed by several years of above-target inflation, rising to 4% during the recovery from
the pandemic. However, this should be treated with some caution.27
Turning to the main focus of our paper, our simulations reveal that the pandemic has very different
impacts on different types of worker. Job losses affect non-graduates much more severely than gradu-
ates. Nearly 1.2 million non-graduates lose their jobs by the end of 2020, compared to 0.4 million job
losses among graduates. The unemployment rate of non-graduates rises to 10.1% compared to 6.8% for
graduates; by the end of 2020Q3, 2.0 million non-graduates are unemployed, compared to just below 1
million graduates. The real wages of non-graduates fall by 2.0%, whereas wages of graduates employed
in high productivity firms fall by 1.9%. The employment of different types of worker differs markedly
across the pandemic. Employment of non-graduates in low productivity firms falls by 8.1% by the end
of 2020 and reaches pre-pandemic values by mid-2021. The structure of graduate employment changes
markedly and the adjustment back to previous values lasts beyond 2024. Employment of graduates
in high productivity firms declines slightly but then increases, driven by the increased demand for the
output of high productivity firms. By contrast, employment of graduates in non-graduate roles falls
9.6%. Employment of graduates in these different types of firm only returns slowly to pre-pandemic
levels, with the adjustment lasting beyond 2023. Interestingly, our model predicts a rise in productivity
as the proportion of graduates employed in lower productivity firms declines. The different experience of
different workers gives rise to the composition effects similar to those raised in Solon et al. (1994), and
more recently, during the pandemic, Rouse and Gimbel (2021). The the result shows that the average
wage falls by less than the wages paid by high productivity and low productivity firms, due to the rise
26If we use ϕw,h = ϕw,l = 0.85, the real wage falls by 5.4%.
27For two reasons; first, inflation is especially difficult to forecast during the pandemic as adverse demand and supply
shocks move it in different directions, in contrast to the effect of these shocks on output, employment and unemployment;
and second, our simple model does not allow for variations in the mark-up. There is evidence that increased mark-ups
increased inflation from 2020Q2, as major retailers ceased competitive price reductions (Jaravel and O’Connell (2020)).
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in the share of employment at higher wage high productivity firms resulting from the high rate of low
productivity job loss. Without this composition effect, the real wage would fall by 1.9%. Workers in
low-paying jobs have been harder hit by the pandemic. This implies that a larger proportion of low-paid
workers
Similarly, the shift in consumption towards the, output of high productivity firms moderates the fall
in inflation; the inflation rate would reach -2.9% without this composition effect.
3.4.4 Shocks or Structure?
The labour market experience of non-graduates during the pandemic is clearly worse than that of grad-
uates. This reflects both the structure of the economy, since graduates employed by high productivity
firms have higher wages and greater job security than non-graduates, and the nature of the shocks caused
by the pandemic, which concentrated job losses in low productivity firms and led to larger falls in demand
for these firms. To study the relative impact of these, we construct a counterfactual scenario in which
the adverse shocks affecting high and low productivity firms are equal. To do this, we amend the shocks
as in column (ii) of Table 3.4), so the impact of the pandemic on job destruction, productivity and wages
is the same for high and low productivity firms, and there is no shift in demand towards the output of
high productivity firms.
The results, shown in Figure 3.3), reveal how the shocks associated with the pandemic have increased
the disadvantage of non-graduates in the UK labour market. Unemployment of non-graduates continues
to exceed unemployment of graduates, but the gap between them narrows. Unemployment of non-
graduates decreases from 2.18 million to 1.72 million. The percentage fall in employment of non-graduates
is now similar to that of graduates employed in high productivity firms; in contrast to the baseline
scenario. The proportional fall in wages in high and low productivity firms is now also more similar,
with non-graduate wages falling by 2.8%, compared to 3.4% in the baseline. As a consequence, the rate
of deflation is reduced.
3.5 Conclusions
There has been no event similar to the COVID-19 pandemic in recent history. At the time of writing
this chapter, the full impact of the pandemic is still unknown, but there is little doubt that it will shape
the economy in the years to come. From the onset of the pandemic and Lockdown in the UK, some
patterns in the labour market and economy were clear: there was a reduction in the number of workers
in the labour market due to the disease, a decrease in demand and productivity, job loss, and there were
differing impacts for different sectors and types of worker.
We examined the impact of the pandemic on graduates and non-graduates in the UK. Sectors with
higher proportions of non-graduates were harder hit by the pandemic than sectors with more graduate
roles, but even in the absence of this difference, our model showed that non-graduates were still slightly
worse-off than graduates because their productivity and employment opportunities are less than those
of graduates.
Our model recognises the difference in the labour market experience for graduates and non-graduates
in the UK is a useful base for evaluating and formulating targeted policy interventions. As the impacts
of the pandemic unravel, it wiill become possible to simulate more precise magnitudes for the shocks in
the model. The model can also be extended to include economic inactivity and movements of workers in
and out of the labour force, or adjusted to model the experiences of employees in permanent employment
compared to the self-employed and gig workers, and how the pandemic and policy interventions have
impacted these types of worker.
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Since the start of the pandemic in the UK, there have been three lockdowns of varying severity, and
according to the Office for National Statistics Business Insights and Conditions Survey for May 2021,
3.9% of businesses across all industries have permanently stopped trading. ONS estimates for May 2021
also show that about 75.9% of adults in England have tested positive for COVID-19 antibodies, 76.6%
in Wales, 75.0% in Northern Ireland, and 68.6% in Scotland. This chapter was completed in mid-2020
using early projections of the scale of the impact of the pandemic to analyse the possible effects on the
wage, output, inflation, graduate and non-graduate employment and unemployment. In this section, I
look back on the results of the model presented in this chapter and comment on them in light of more
recent macroeconomic data.
The actual data are presented in Fig. 3.4). Closely following the forecast of 9% unemployment
projected by the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Report of May 2020, our model projected that
unemployment would reach 8.7% by 2020Q3, output will fall by 14%, while employment would fall by
6.6% by the end of 2020. The actual impact of the pandemic on unemployment and employment seen
in the data is significantly less than the early BoE projection and the projection of our model. The data
show that unemployment only rose to 4.8% in 2020Q3, being 1% point higher than the unemployment
rate in 2019Q3, and peaked at 5.1% in 2020Q4. The data also show that employment fell by about 1.3%
points in 2020Q4. However, LFS data should be taken with caution because of issues with reporting
employment and unemployment, and changes in the composition of the survey participants and jobs
during the pandemic. For example, the May 2021 BoE Monetary Policy Report highlights discrepancies
between the number of employees reported in the Labour Force Survey, and employees reported in the
Workforce Job Survey and PAYE data. The PAYE and Workforce Job Survey show larger declines in
the number of employees, whereas employee numbers reported in the LFS is stable. One explanation
for this proposed in the report is workers reclassifying their employment status from self-employed to
employee. In addition, the ONS reports that because face-to-face interviews were largely replaced by
phone interviews with lower response rates, the LFS data during the pandemic may be less representative
of the pre-pandemic sample.28 Another explanation by the ONS worth noting is the difficulty in defining
employment status during the pandemic; there are workers who have done no work, have not been
furloughed, and have received no wages during the pandemic, who report as being employed because
they expect to return to their former job after the pandemic.29
The overprediction of the impact of the pandemic on unemployment in our model has important
implications for the projections for inflation, output and wages. Our model predicts 2% deflation by the
end of 2020, but actual inflation was at the lowest in August 2020 at 0.2%. ONS data show that output
fell by about 15.8% points between 2020Q1 and 2020Q2, but had recovered by about 12% points by
2020Q3, whereas, our model predicted a 30% fall in aggregate output.
On a final note, it is worth pointing out the transition dynamics between employment, unemploy-
ment and inactivity during the pandemic. The model presented in this chapter does not include the
economically inactive. However, unemployment-inactivity transitions have been widely analysed in the
literature, and there is evidence that during recessions, there is an increase in the transition of workers
from inactivity into unemployment and a fall in the number leaving unemployment to inactivity (Elsby
et al. (2015)). These unemployment-inactivity transitions can explain a significant proportion of the
fluctuations in unemployment across the business cycle (Gomes (2012), Razzu and Singleton (2016),
Singleton (2018)).














































































Figure 3.5: Transitions between Unemployment and Inactivity during the Pandemic
Note: Plots are derived from data from the Office for National Statistics.
LFS data. The figure shows an increase in the number of workers transitioning from unemployment to
inactivity, and a sharp decrease in the transition from inactivity to unemployment between 2020Q1 and
2020Q2, and between 2020Q3 and 2020Q4. The figure also shows that the reverse occurs between 2020Q2
and 2020Q3. These changes might be significant because they might reflect the labour market response
to the first and second lockdown, and the early announcements of changes to the Job Retention Scheme
which may not have been captured in our model.
A later version of the model presented in this chapter attempts to resolve the points raised in this
section. In the later version, we use the latest LFS data, noting the possible shortcomings of the LFS
during the pandemic. We also combine the unemployed and economically inactive to present a broader
view of the labour market and the dynamics during the pandemic for graduates and non-graduates in
different statuses and types of employment in the UK.
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4. The Impact of the Rising Gig Economy on UK Wages and Output
4.1 Introduction
The nature of work in the UK is changing. Over the past three decades, the term “employee” has
become less synonymous with being a worker as a growing proportion of the workforce has turned to self-
employment, and firms substitute long-term career employees with contingent workers and contractors.
In the UK, self-employment increased from 8% of the workforce in 1980 to about 16% in 2016. Also, in
1990, about 30% of self-employed workers employed other workers, but as at 2016, more self-employed
workers have chosen work alone and only 16% employ other workers (ONS (2016b)). Between 2010 and
2016, the number of part-time workers increased from about 6.6 million to about 7 million workers while
zero-hour contracts increased from about 170,000 to over a million workers (Blanchflower et al. (2017),
Haldane (2017), ONS (2019)). Compared to the EU, the UK has the highest proportion of the workforce
engaged in self-employment and part-time work (Taylor et al. (2017)). These workers often engage in
non-employee work, just-in-time, on-demand, contingent or alternative work arrangements which are
collectively referred to as gig work. Gig jobs are characterised by high turnover and flexibility, irregular
working hours, and are usually created on demand with no certainty of future engagement with the firm.
It is argued that the gig economy increases the efficiency of labour allocation, promotes creativity
and entrepreneurship, flexibility and time to meet non-work commitments, offers work experience across
different sectors and locations, and provides employment opportunities for the long-term unemployed
and the unemployable (Hurst and Pugsley (2011), Katz and Greenwald (2012), Taylor et al. (2017)).1
However, it has also been argued that the transient employer-employee relationships and the basic, highly
fragmented tasks which characterise gig work can lead to poor wages, job insecurity and the potential
decline of the structure of modern-day firms and industries (Haldane (2017), Katz and Greenwald (2012)).
Gig jobs often attract lower wages than the same type of job in the traditional sector (Freidman (2014),
Katz and Krueger (2019)); there is evidence that firms in the UK can save up to 70% on their wage
bill from hiring online gig workers instead of traditional workers, and online gig workers in the UK
and EU are worse off than the average traditional worker in the same country (Gomez-Herrera et al.
(2017)). However, it is worth mentioning that due to exchange rate differences between high- and low-
income countries, online gig workers in low-income countries might earn higher wages than their peers
in traditional jobs when they are employed by firms in high-income countries (ibid.).2 UK zero-hour
contract workers earn 35% less per hour than the median hourly wage for all other types of worker,
and 10% less per hour after controlling for differences in characteristics across jobs (Adams and Prassl
(2018)). Also, the modal earning of self-employed workers is about £160 less than the modal employee
wage (ONS (2018c)). Furthermore, male part-time workers in the UK earn less than their counterparts
in full-time jobs even after controlling for differences in skill and job characteristics (O’Dorchai et al.
(2007)), the wage for full-time work in the UK is more likely to increase while the wage for part-time
work is more likely to decrease. There is also evidence of wage scarring, that is, the adverse impact
of part-time work on earnings remains after workers transition into full-time jobs (Fouarge and Muffels
(2009)).
On a different note, from 2011 to 2020Q1, the UK unemployment rate fell, and at 3.8% in 2020Q1,
unemployment was at its lowest in over 40 years.3 Since 2011, job vacancies reached record numbers,4
1Also, the irregular nature of some gig jobs implies that gig employment may be underreported. The US household
employment survey classifies individuals as employed if they have received a wage or profit for work done in the previous
week. Primary survey data by Bracha and Burke (2016) indicates that the 2015 US labour force participation rate would
be about 2% points higher if all gig workers were counted.
2Differences in exchange rates may also explain the evidence that the worldwide average online gig wage is higher than






yet, the real wage and output growth were relatively flat.5 Other OECD countries show a similar trend
(Bell and Blanchflower (2018a)).
In this chapter, I describe the UK gig economy and the factors that may be responsible for the
rising trend of gig work in the UK. Using the characteristics of the gig economy that I describe below,
I construct a two-sector model with a labour market characterised by search frictions to show why the
wage for gig work differs from the wage for a similar job in the traditional sector. I then simulate the
impact of demand and supply shocks to show how the gig economy changes the macroeconomic response
to shocks, and how this might contribute to the slow wage and output growth in the UK.
There are three main factors in the literature which explain the expansion of the UK gig economy in
the past 30 years. Firstly, declining trade union membership, loss of bargaining power and rising unem-
ployment encourage the transfer of training costs, business and economic risk to workers, increases job
loss and lowers wages (Deakin and Reed (2000), Haldane (2017), Freidman (2014), Katz and Greenwald
(2012), Solow (2015)). Few unions and collective bodies exist for gig workers6 and gig workers have strong
conflicting opinions on collective action and regulation. Survey evidence indicates that gig workers face
adverse work conditions and are often exploited by firms, but many feel that unionisation or regulation
would restrict their flexibility and competitiveness (CIPD (2017), Katz and Greenwald (2012)). The
CIPD (2017) UK survey found that 57% of gig workers strongly agree that firms exploit the lack of gig
economy regulation, 70% feel that they are less able than traditional workers to access financial safety
nets, 63% feel that the government should enforce basic rights and benefits for gig workers, but 50%
would sacrifice benefits and security for the flexibility they enjoy from the lack of regulation in the gig
sector and 17% would not report a complaint or seek compensation.7 On the firms’ side, survey evidence
shows that UK firms with mid-range levels of unionisation are highly likely to employ contingency work-
ers, but firms with high and low levels of unionisation have markedly low numbers of gig workers (Uzzi
and Barsness (1998)). The evidence points to the fact that high rates of union participation prevents
firms from hiring gig workers, and low levels of union membership means that permanent workers can
be made as flexible as firms require with little hinderance (ibid.).8 The latter suggests more serious
implications for the quality and future of traditional work.
Secondly, there is evidence that the uptake of gig work is countercyclical and an indicator of labour
market slack (Bell and Blanchflower (2018a), Bracha and Burke (2016))9. For example, participation in
gig work fell as unemployment fell during the first internet boom between 1995 and 2000, and increased
when unemployment increased at the end of the internet boom. A similar response was observed during
the Financial Crisis.10 This is because in a downturn, workers who have held traditional jobs take gig
employment when unable to find other traditional jobs and are facing financial hardship. These workers
return to traditional employment after economic recovery.
The third factor is technological advancement and automation, and there is some discord on their
impact on the labour market and macroeconomy. There is substantial evidence that automation and
artificial intelligence (AI) substitute for labour and hinder the development and demand for skilled labour
(Beaudry et al. (2016), Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), Frey and Osbourne (2017)). But there is equally
5See www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/averagew
eeklyearningsingreatbritain/january2020#: :text=In%20real%20terms%2C%20annual%20pay,(unchanged%20from%20la
st%20month) for wage growth and www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/ihyp/pn2 for output
growth.
6eg. the Independent Drivers’ Guild for Uber drivers, the Freelancers’ Union for freelance workers, Sharing Economy
UK (SEUK) and most notably, the Independent Workers of Great Britain (IWGB).
7The survey was mainly focused on online gig workers.
8This has given rise to terms such as permatemps which is used to describe contingency workers on extended or rolling
contracts with firms.
9These studies focus on gig work participation on the intensive margin.
10During the Financial Crisis, the number of part-time workers looking for full-time jobs and small business entrepreneurs
increased. See Fairlie (2013), Green and Livanos (2015), ONS (2020d), ONS (2018b).
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strong evidence that automation creates more jobs than it destroys; a UK study by Deloitte showed that
for each job lost to technology, over 4 new jobs are created, and the wages of the new jobs are, on
average, £10,000 higher.11 In either case, there is little dispute that Information Technology, apps and
devices, automation and AI are changing the nature of work and the types of worker required to fill job
positions. With Information Technology, AI and automation, workers can find work and perform tasks
remotely and often in isolation, firms can coordinate workers remotely with ease, making tasks highly
fragmented, specialised and polarised (Beaudry et al. (2016), Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), Frey and
Osbourne (2017), Goos and Manning (2007), Katz and Krueger (2017)). Survey evidence shows that
UK firms that implemented new job-related technologies in the preceding three years were more likely
to hire temporary workers to perform tasks which were executed by permanent employees (Uzzi and
Barsness (1998));12 this suggests that technology might induce the creation of more gig jobs and might
also encourage more workers to take them.
Before proceeding to describe the characteristics of the UK gig economy, it is pertinent to note that
there is no unified definition of gig employment in the literature. Gig employment is often used to
describe online or app-based work, but I do not use this definition because of the evidence that the
number of workers engaged in offline gig work is about twice the number of online gig workers (Katz and
Krueger (2019). Instead, I adopt the definition used by Adams-Prassl et al. (2020), Bracha and Burke
(2016), Freidman (2014), Katz and Greenwald (2012) and Katz and Krueger (2019), and distinguish
gig work from traditional work by the type of job contract the workers have with the firm. Gig work
comprises lone-working self-employment, independent contract and consulting jobs, freelance, on-call,
part-time,13 temporary, agency and zero-hour contract work. I identify gig workers in the data as the
lone-working self-employed whose work hours vary and workers in temporary, agency, casual and seasonal
work. Traditional jobs have regular working hours, open-ended contracts and long-term career prospects
with the firm. I identify workers in this category as the self-employed who employ other workers, the
lone-working self-employed whose hours do not vary and workers who are in permanent work.14
The gig sector has a range of jobs identical to the traditional sector because workers often take gig
jobs similar to the traditional jobs they have held in the past (Freidman (2014)) and because workers
often use gig employment as a stepping-stone to the traditional job they aspire to have (Booth et al.
(2002)). However, there is evidence that productivity is lower in the gig sector because there is a greater
proportion of low-skilled, labour intensive jobs in the gig sector than in the traditional sector. For exam-
ple, in the UK, there are more temporary workers in wholesale and retail trade, health and social work,
education, accommodation and food, arts and entertainment; whereas, temporary workers are fewer in
manufacturing, professional, scientific, technical, public administration, finance, information and com-
munication occupations (Forde and Slater (2001), Forde and Slater (2005), ONS (2018a)). Furthermore,
due to the high turnover rate associated with gig work, workers and firms in the gig economy often do
not engage in costly training (Booth et al. (2002), Forde and Slater (2005)).
In this model, traditional wholesale firms offer traditional jobs and use a technology that requires
only inflexible labour which traditional workers provide. Similarly, gig wholesale firms offer gig jobs and
use only flexible labour which gig workers provide. In spite of the evidence that jobs in the traditional
sector often attract higher wages than the same job in the gig sector, traditional jobs cannot be said to
be strictly better than gig work, at least, from the perspective of individual workers. The data shows
11https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/Growth/deloitte-uk-insights-from-brawns-to-
brain.pdf
12Also, a US survey found that firms that implemented new job-related technologies lowered the skill requirements of
jobs, offered lower wages and fewer prospects of career progression (Roos and Reskin (1992)).
13Part-time workers are included in this definition to account for the substantial number of workers who hold part-time
jobs for economic reasons and want full-time jobs and/or workers who hold multiple part-time jobs which together do not
make up full-time employment (Bell and Blanchflower (2011), Bell and Blanchflower (2018b)).
14I expatiate on the categories of worker in Section 4.8.
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that workers take gig jobs when unable to find traditional employment, to increase income, particularly
when facing redundancy or retirement, to meet a demand in the market, for better work conditions and
job satisfaction, to manage unpaid care/family responsibilities, illness, disability or full-time education,
or simply because gig work is the nature of their career. The data also shows that workers’ reasons
for gig work change randomly over their lifetime. Therefore, I assume that job search is random and
continuous. Following the evidence outlined, I also assume that the traditional sector is characterised by
a higher bargaining power and productivity than the gig sector.
I assume that unemployed workers search for gig and traditional jobs, will take the job they find
and continue searching for other jobs. Gig jobs are short-lived, so I assume that all gig jobs end after
one period.15 Workers in gig employment search for traditional employment and other gig jobs.16 This
means that at the end of a gig job, a gig worker can be re-hired by the same firm, find another gig job
or move to traditional employment; otherwise, the gig worker returns to the search pool as unemployed
and is not eligible for employment until the next period. On the other hand, workers in the traditional
sector are in a more secure form of employment; the data shows very small traditional-traditional job
transition. Therefore, I assume that workers in traditional employment do not search for other traditional
jobs, but search for gig work. When traditional job matches end, the workers return to the search pool
as unemployed and are not eligible for work until the next period. Some traditional job matches survive
but the workers move to gig employment.
Following the evidence above, the model will show how the lower productivity and bargaining power
in the gig sector leads to lower wages for gig workers than traditional workers doing the same job. Also,
gig jobs are flexible and are created on a task-by-task basis, and workers consider gig work to be a
substitute for traditional employment (Bracha and Burke (2016)). As such, economic downturn and
recovery are characterised by a flow of unemployed workers into gig employment due to hardship (ibid.),
and in particular, engaging in low-paid self-employment (Blundell et al. (2013), Fairlie (2013)). More
workers joining the gig economy can stabilise employment and facilitate economic recovery. However,
this may result in slack in the gig sector which, combined with the relatively low productivity in the
sector, can lower the wage and output growth in the gig sector and the whole economy.17 The model
will show that the segmented nature of the UK labour market can imply low job finding rates from
unemployment, and low- to low-wage job transitions which can exacerbate slow wage and output growth
(Danninger (2016)).18
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in two significant ways: Firstly, most of the studies
on gig working are in form of surveys and reports,19 and often focus on online or app-based gig jobs.
In this chapter, I attempt to capture the entire gig economy by including both online and offline gig
workers. Secondly, academic rersearch on the gig economy and the impact on the macroeconomy are less
common, and are often carried out on the US labour market.20 Here, I use the UK Labour Force Survey
data to construct a two-sector model that describes the gig and traditional sectors of the UK. Dual sector
models have been used to analyse the formal and informal sectors (eg Castillo and Montoro (2012a)) and
graduates and non-graduates in different types of jobs in the UK (eg Martin and Okolo (2020)). The
model described in this chapter shares features with the model in (Martin and Okolo (2020). I subject
15The 2019 Q3 LFS shows that 39.1% of gig jobs do not have fixed duration and an additional 16.7% have a duration
less than 6 months.
16There is strong evidence that traditional workers take gig jobs with the intention of transitioning to traditional jobs
(Booth et al. (2002), de Graaf et al. (2011), Farber (2010), Farber (2011)), Gebel (2010)).
17For instance, between 2008 and 2015, there was a 20% drop in the real wage of lone-working self-employed workers,
but traditional workers and the self-employed who hire additional workers faced milder real wage decrease (Blanchflower
et al, 2017). I discuss this in more detail later in the paper.
18See also Gash (2008) for discussions on dual labour markets and workers being ‘trapped’ in temporary employment.
19For example, The Good work: The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices by Taylor et al. (2017), surveys by
the Chartered Institute of Personnel Development (CIPD) and the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (DBIS).
20The most prominent are Bracha and Burke (2016; 2021)
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the model to productivity shocks in the traditional and gig sectors, aggregate demand and supply shocks
and analyse the impact of these shocks on unemployment, employment, wages and output.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 The Labour Market
There is one type of worker and two sectors: the gig and traditional sectors. Workers search for work in
both sectors, will take the job that they get and continue searching for the job they want. So workers
can be unemployed u, in traditional employment ntr or in gig employment ng
ut + ntrt + n
g
t = 1 (4.1)
where the labour force is normalised to 1.
Gig jobs are short-lived so I assume that they have a duration of one period. This means that at
the start of each period, workers previously in gig employment face four possibilities: i) being re-hired
by the same gig firm, ii) finding a job in another gig firm, iii) finding a job in a traditional firm, or iv)
becoming unemployed. The gig workers who are not re-hired search for other gig and traditional jobs,
and if a match is formed, they begin their new job without delay. Gig workers who are not re-hired and
do not form another match at the beginning of the period become unemployed and would not be eligible
for employment until the next period.
In contrast, jobs at traditional firms are more secure and matches typically have a longer duration.
At the beginning of each period, some job matches at traditional firms break down and the separated
workers become unemployed. These newly separated traditional workers are not eligible for employment
until the following period. Some matches at traditional firms survive but end because the workers find
jobs in the gig sector. Other matches survive and the workers enter the next period employed in the
same firm. Fig 4.1) summarises the job search and worker flows in the model.
At the beginning of each period, gig firms post vacancies which they aim to fill by re-hiring some of
their past workers, and new workers from other gig firms and traditional firms. Workers in gig work are
re-hired by the same firm with probability rhg. Gig workers search for new gig jobs bearing in mind
the probability of not being re-hired in the same firm; their search is given by sg,gt = (1 − rhg)ζg,gn
g
t .
Unemployed workers search for gig jobs sg,ut = ζg,uut and workers in traditional jobs search for gig jobs








where τ tr is the traditional job destruction rate, ζg,g, ζg,u and ζg,tr are the search intensities which I
define as the effort, frequency and scope of workers search for work intended to increase their probability
of finding a job match (Khele et al. (2018), Pissarides (1984)). I assume that search intensity is constant,
following Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2018a).21
Similarly, traditional firms post vacancies at the beginning of each period and aim to fill them with
workers from the gig sector and the unemployed. So search for traditional jobs by unemployed workers is
str,ut = ζtr,uut, and for workers in the gig sector, search for a traditional job is s
tr,g
t = (1− rhg)ζtr,gn
g
t ,22
21There are many different categories of search in this model; I assume fixed search intensity for simplicity. Gertler et al.
(2020b) and Krause and Lubik (2006) assume fixed and variable search intensities for unemployed and on-the-job worker
search respectively. See also DeLoach and Kurt (2013) and Shimer (2004) for empirical evidence of the (a)cyclicality of
search intensity.
22The data shows that of the workers who remained in traditional work between 2019Q3 and 2019Q4, only about
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All new matches become productive immediately. The matching functions for wholesale traditional
and gig firms respectively are









t are the number of vacancies posted by traditional and gig firms, mtr and mg are the matching























Given that the rate at which workers find jobs depends on their search intensity, unemployed workers






f tr,ut = ζtr,uf trt (4.8)




and in the same way, the traditional-gig, gig-traditional and gig-gig job-finding rates are f tr,gt = (1 −
rhg)ζtr,gf trt , f
g,tr






















t + Ptwtrt ntrt + Ptbut + Πt +Bt−1 = Ct + P bBt (4.11)
where P is the price index, P b is the nominal price of bonds, b is unemployment benefit, Π is the
dividend recieved from the ownership of firms and C is household consumption, eεdt is a preference
shock, εdt = ρdεdt−1 + %dt , 0 ≤ ρd ≤ 1 and %dt is distributed as N(0, σ2d). The wage for traditional




The household maximises utility subject to their budget constraint, choosing consumption and bond


















The household consumes retail goods from the traditional and gig sectors. I assume
Ct =
[
(Γtr) 1ν (Ctrt )
ν−1





where Ctr is consumption of traditional retail goods, Cg is consumption of gig retail goods, ν is the
elasticity of substitution between both types of good and Γtr is the share of household consumption that
is made up of traditional retail goods. The corresponding price index is
Pt =
[





where P trt and P
g
t are the price indexes for traditional and gig retail goods respectively, so the demand












The household consumes a bundle of goods from each sector. Consumption of traditional retail goods















1−νtr where Ctrj is house-
hold consumptionof traditional good j and P trj is the price of good j. Similarly, household consumption
















where Cgj is household consumption of gig retail good j and P
g
j is the price of gig retail good j. These













I assume that all traditional wholesale firms are identical and all gig wholesale firms are identical.
Traditional wholesale firms produce intermediate goods which are sold to traditional retail firms in a
perfectly competitive market. Likewise, gig wholesale firms produce intermediate goods which they sell
to gig retail firms in a perfectly competitive market. Wholesale firms post vacancies and hire workers to
produce intermediate goods.
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4.4.1 Traditional Wholesale Firms
The representative traditional firm has the profit function













where P tr,Wt is the nominal price of the traditional wholesale good, Y tr is the output produced by the
traditional firm, γtr is the cost of posting a vacancy in the traditional sector and vtr is the number of
vacancies posted by the traditional firm. The production function is
Y tr,Wt = Atrt ntrt (4.21)









t , 0 ≤ ρstr ≤ 1 and %s
tr
t is distributed as N(0, σ2str ).
The traditional firm uses technology that requires only inflexible labour input. The evolution of
employment in each firm is
ntr = ρtrt ntrt−1 + qtrt vtrt (4.22)
where ρtrt = 1 − τ tr − f
g,tr
t is the probability that the match survives and the workers do not move to
the gig sector.
The traditional firm maximises profits choosing the number of vacancies to post to obtain
∂J trt
∂vtrt
= −γtr + χtrt qtrt = 0 (4.23)







Atrt − wtrt + Etβt,t+1ρtrt+1χtrt+1 − χtrt = 0 (4.24)





where the markup of the traditional retail firm µtrt =
P trt
P tr,Wt






marginal hiring cost of a traditional worker.
4.4.2 Gig Wholesale Firms















subject to the production function is
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t , 0 ≤ ρsg ≤ 1 and %s
g
t is distributed as N(0, σ2sg ). The evolution of employment of workers












where ρgt = rhg. For the sector, ρ
g
t = rhg + (1− rhg)f
g,g
t .
Similar to the traditional wholesale firm, the gig firm maximises profits choosing the number of





where the markup of the gig retail firm is µgt =
P gt
P g,Wt





) is the marginal
hiring cost of workers in the gig sector.
4.5 The Wage
All workers in traditional employment earn the same wage and all workers in gig employment earn the
same wage. The wage in each sector is determined by a Nash bargain between firms and workers in their
respective sectors
4.5.1 The Surplus
The household derives utility when a worker is in traditional employment. At the same time, for each
worker in traditional employment, the opportunity cost to the household is one less gig and unemployed












= C−ηt wtrt + βtEtρtrt+1
∂Ht+1
∂ntrt+1












Strt = wtrt − b+ (ρtrt+1 − f
tr,u





where βt = βeε
d
t+k and βt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor in (4.13). The surplus to the household
for an additional worker in gig employment is
Sgt = w
g













t imply that for an additional worker in traditional or gig employment, the household receives
a wage but not benefits, as the worker is no longer unemployed. The household also receives expected
utility from the continuation of the new job match, but loses some utility as the worker the will not
search for work in either sector in the next period.




F trt = Atrt − wtrt + βt,t+1Etρtrt+1F trt+1 (4.33)














4. The Impact of the Rising Gig Economy on UK Wages and Output
4.5.2 The Wage Bargain
The household and the traditional firm maximise (F trt )ϑ
tr (Strt )(1−ϑ
tr) choosing the wage to obtain the
sharing rule
(1− ϑtr)F trt = ϑtrStrt (4.35)
where ϑtr is the bargaining power of workers in the traditional sector. Substituting (4.31) and (4.33)
into the sharing rule gives the traditional sector wage
wtrt = (1− ϑtr)
[





and similarly, the gig sector wage is
wgt = (1− ϑg)
[





Following the evidence that the bargaining power and productivity in the gig sector are lower than in
the traditional sector, the gig wage is lower than the traditional wage. This explains the evidence that
workers in gig employment earn lower wages than the same type of worker in the same type of job in the
traditional sector.23
Market tightness reflects the difficulty with which firms replace their workers. The model shows
that market tightness in each sector positively impacts the wage in the same sector, and in addition,
market tightness in one sector directly impacts the wage in the other sector. Given that workers can
find employment in the other sector to substitute for employment in one sector, gig work is an outside
option for workers in traditional employment and vice versa for workers in gig employment. When gig
market tightness is high, the value of traditional workers’ outside option is high, and by extension, the
traditional workers’ value to the traditional firm is high. This results in a higher traditional sector wage.
Conversely, when gig market tightness is low, the value of the traditional worker’s outside option falls,
which means a relatively lower traditional wage. The same applies to workers in the gig sector and the
gig wage.
The relevance of gig and traditional market tightness in both (4.37) and (4.36) is that poor labour
market conditions in one sector can lead to relatively low wages in both sectors and a lower average wage.
In particular, the wage equations suggest that if the traditional sector is thriving alongside a waning gig
sector, the gig sector wage might be improved by the good condition of the traditional sector, but the
traditional wage might be lowered by the weak gig sector. The reverse would apply to a thriving gig
sector alongside a weak traditional sector. Furthermore, if labour market conditions are poor in both
sectors, the wage in both sectors would be even lower. This offers insight into the role of the gig economy
in wage growth in the UK.
4.6 Retail Firms
I assume that traditional retail firms are identical. They purchase intermediate goods from traditional
wholesale firms to costlessly produce differentiated finished traditional goods. Finished traditional goods
are sold to households in a monopolistically competitive market, so I assume Y trt = Ctrt . Gig retail firms
are also identical, purchase intermediate wholesale gig goods, costlessly produce differentiated finished
23It is worth noting that an alternative explanation for wage dispersion and slow wage growth associated with the
gig economy in the literature is that there are nonpecuniary benefits from gig work which make the wage for gig work
comparatively low. Or put differently, traditional work requires a premium to offset the nonpecuniary benefits of gig work,
which makes the traditional wage higher than the gig wage. See the Rosen (1986) theory for equalisaing wage differentials.
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gig goods that are sold to households in a monopolistically competitive market, so Y gt = C
g
t .



















and the production function
Y trt = Y
tr,W
t (4.40)
where Y tr,W is the amount of traditional wholesale goods purchased by the traditional retail firm, Y trt
is the output of the traditional retail firm and ωtr is the probability that the firm is unable to reset its













is the price of the intermediate traditional good and µtr = νtrνtr−1 is the markup.









I assume that the traditional retail good is similar but superior to the gig retail good because tra-
ditional wholesale firms use better production technology. However, the price of the gig retail good is
lower than the traditional retail good given that the cost of hiring workers and the wage in the gig sector







and the gig retail marginal cost is
low mcgt+k < mctrt+k. So the gig sector receives its share of aggregate demand by offering the household
a cheap alternative to traditional retail goods.
Firms in the traditional retail sector follow the price-setting rule
P trt = (1− ωtr)P
∗tr
t + ωtrP trt−1 (4.43)
where (1 − ωtr) firms reset their price in period t, ωtr firms are unable to reset their price retain their
past price. Taking the log deviation of (4.41) and (4.43) around a zero inflation steady state gives
πtrt = κtrm̂c
tr
t + βπtrt+1 (4.44)
This is the Phillips Curve for the traditional sector with the slope κtr = (1−ω
tr)(1−βωtr)
ωtr . In the same






where κg = (1−ω
g)(1−βωg)
ωg is the slope.
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4.7 Monetary Policy
I assume that the interest rate is set following the Taylor rule
it = i+ φππt + φy(yt − y) + εit (4.46)
where φπ and φy are the monetary policy responses to inflation and output, εit is a monetary policy
shock.
4.8 Calibration
I used 2019 third and fourth quarter Labour Force Survey data to derive labour market calibration
targets. I excluded the under-16 and economically inactive respondents in both quarters,24 leaving
21, 909 cases which made up the sample. Of the 21, 909 workers in the sample, in Q3, 21, 231 were
employed while the remaining 678 were unemployed. This implies n = 0.969 and u = 0.031.
I have categorised gig and traditional workers based on their reported main job and I do not consider
second jobs. This does not impact the classification of workers and their rates of transition between
sectors, but it suggests that the size of UK gig economy might be understated. I identified workers in
traditional employment by the employees in permanent jobs, the self-employed who employ other workers
and the lone-working self-employed whose hours do not vary. I identified workers in gig employment by
employees whose jobs were not permanent, including respondents who were working for an employment
agency, in casual or seasonal work, under contract for a fixed period or fixed task and any other reason
for not being permanent, and the lone-working self-employed whose work hours vary. From these, I
determined that the number of workers in traditional employment is 18, 236, the number of workers in
gig work is 2, 995 and therefore, ntr = 0.832 and ng = 0.137.
Following each respondent from Q3 to Q4, I tracked the changes in their employment status and type
to derive job transition rates. Of the 678 workers who were unemployed in Q3, 566 became employed
in traditional jobs in Q4, so 566678 gives the unemployment-to-traditional job-finding rate f tr,u = 0.8348.
Similarly, 96 of the Q3 unemployed workers became employed in gig work in Q4, so the unemployment-
to-gig job-finding rate fg,u = 0.1416.
On job-to-job transition, of the 2, 995 workers in gig employment in Q3, 353 workers remained in gig
work with the same employer in Q4; I assume that these worker’s contracts were renewed, so 3532,995 gives
the gig re-hiring rate rhg = 0.1179. Between Q3 and Q4, 2, 462 of the 2, 995 gig workers transitioned
to traditional employment, this implies that the rate at which gig workers find traditional jobs given
that they are not re-hired by the same gig firm is (1 − rhg)f tr,g = 0.8220, which means the the gig-
to-traditional job-finding rate f tr,g = 0.9319. There were 17 workers in gig work in Q3 who remained
in gig work but changed employers; this implies (1 − rhg)fg,g = 0.0057 and the gig-gig job transition
rate fg,g = 0.0064. Between Q3 and Q4, 2, 536 traditional workers moved to gig employment, so 2,53618,236
gives the traditional-to-gig job-finding rate fg,tr = 0.1391. Also, between Q3 and Q4, 15, 168 traditional
workers remained in traditional employment; I assume that their match continues, so 15,16818,236 gives the
traditional job continuation rate ρtr = 0.8318.
To better match the calibration targets, I set the coefficient of relative risk aversion η = 0.73, the
monetary policy response to inflation and output respectively φπ = 1.48 and φy = 0.31, employment
opportunity cost b = 0.58 and the matching elasticities αtr = αg = 0.3. There is evidence that hiring
traditional workers is costlier than hiring gig workers and gig jobs are highly fragmented so gig firms and
workers face fewer challenges with search and matching. Given the relatively higher traditional sector
24I do not model entry and exit from the labour force.
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recruitment cost, traditional firms need to have a sufficient number of tasks to be done before deciding
to recruit a worker which implies that workers would need to have a range of skills to fit traditional job
openings. This means that traditional sector search and matching takes more time and effort (Gomez-
Herrera et al. (2017)). Following this evidence and the rising use of online and app-based platforms,25
mobile devices and gadgets, I assume higher matching efficiency and lower cost of posting vacancies in
the gig sector and I set γg = 0.3, γtr = 0.33, mtr = 0.8 and mg = 1. I also assume Atr = 1.5, Ag = 0.8,
ϑtr = 0.51 and ϑg = 0.41 reflecting the relatively low productivity and bargaining power in the gig
sector.
Table 4.1: Calibration Targets
Parameter Label Target Source This Model
ng Workers in Gig Employment 0.137 LFS 0.1370
ntr Workers in Traditional Employment 0.832 LFS 0.8320
u Unemployment 0.031 LFS 0.0310
f tr,u Unemployment-Traditional Job-Finding Rate 0.8348 LFS 0.8341
f tr,g Gig-Traditional Job-Finding Rate 0.9319 LFS 0.9319
fg,u Unemployment-Gig Job-Finding Rate 0.1416 LFS 0.1414
fg,tr Traditional-Gig Job-Finding Rate 0.1391 LFS 0.1393
fg,g Gig-Gig Job-Finding Rate 0.0064 LFS 0.0064
rhg Gig Re-hiring Rate 0.1179 LFS 0.1179
τ tr Traditional Job Destruction Rate 0.0292 LFS 0.04
ρtr Traditional Job Continuation Rate 0.8318 LFS 0.8207
Table 4.2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Label Value Source
r Real Interest Rate 0.0101 Faccini et. al (2013)
η Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion 0.73 Faccini et al (2013)
b Unemployment Benefit 0.58 Faccini et. al (2013)
νtr Traditional Goods Elasticity of Demand 11 Faccini et al (2013)
νg Gig Goods Elasticity of Demand 11 Faccini et al (2013)
ν Aggregate Demand Price Elasticity 11 Faccini et al (2013)
αtr Traditional Sector Vacancy-Matching Elasticity 0.3 Faccini et. al (2013)
αg Gig Sector Vacancy-Matching Elasticity 0.3 Faccini et. al (2013)
mtr Traditional Sector Matching Efficiency 0.8 Author’s calculation
mg Gig Sector Matching Efficiency 1 Author’s calculation
ϑtr Traditional Sector Bargaining Power 0.51 Author’s calculation
ϑg Gig Sector Bargaining Power 0.41 Author’s calculation
γtr Traditional Sector Vacancy Cost 0.33 Author’s calculation
γg Gig Sector Vacancy Cost 0.03 Author’s calculation
ζtr,u Unemployment-Traditional Job Search Intensity 0.777 Author’s calculation
ζtr,g Gig-Traditional Job Search Intensity 8.681 Author’s calculation
continued . . .
25eg. Etsy, Amazon Mechanical Turk, TaskRabbit, Udemy, Facebook Marketplace, Airbnb, Uber, Deliveroo.
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. . . continued
Parameter Label Value Source
ζg,u Unemployment-Gig Job Search Intensity 0.32 Author’s calculation
ζg,g Gig-Gig Job Search Intensity 0.145 Author’s calculation
ζg,tr Traditional-Gig Job Search Intensity 0.3283 Author’s calculation
κtr Slope of Traditional Sector PC 0.1 OBR
κg Slope of Gig Sector PC 0.1 Author’s calculation
Atr Traditional Sector Productivity 1.5 Author’s calculation
Ag Gig Sector Productivity 0.8 Author’s calculation
ī Inflation Target 0.02 OBR
φπ Monetary Policy Response to Inflation 1.48 Faccini et al (2013)
φy Monetary Policy Response to Output 0.31 Faccini et al (2013)
4.9 Results
Firms respond to a positive aggregate demand shock by increasing output. To do this, firms create
vacancies and hire more workers, employment increases and unemployment falls. Due to the economic
expansion, Fig. 4.2) shows that workers who are in gig employment flow into the traditional sector to the
disadvantage of the unemployed. Since the traditional sector is significantly larger than the gig sector,
the traditional sector would account for a larger share of the additional output resulting from the demand
shock. This explains the large movement of workers from gig work to traditional employment and the
contraction of the gig sector as discussed earlier in this chapter. Gig employment falls but unemployment
also falls because of gig workers transitioning to traditional employment. Traditional sector employment
increases and the overall impact of the demand shock on employment is positive.
The result in Fig. 4.2) suggests that i) a large number of workers hold gig jobs until there is an
opportunity to transition to traditional work, ii) the muted increase in total employment compared to
the sharp fall in unemployment suggests that the fall in unemployment is more from the reshuffling
of employed workers who otherwise might have become unemployed, than from the hiring of presently
unemployed workers, and iii) if there are fewer unemployed workers searching for work than those
searching on the job, there is less likelihood for the unemployed to find work, therefore, job-to-job
transitions might reduce employment-to-unemployment transition, but would also reduce transition from
unemployment into employment.
An aggregate supply shock has a similar impact, but there is a larger increase in aggregate and
sectoral output than is the case with an aggregate demand shock. The results are shown in Fig. 4.3).
Traditional and gig sector productivity shocks are shown in Figs. 4.4) and 4.5) respectively. A pro-
ductivity shock in one sector impacts both sectors. A traditional sector productivity shock creates an
expansion in the traditional sector that induces a transition of workers from gig to traditional employ-
ment, but there is also hiring from unemployment into the traditional sector. The gig sector contracts
as workers move from gig to traditional employment, but recovers as the workers remaining in the gig
sector, workers hired from the traditional sector and the unemployed fill in the jobs left behind by the
workers who made the gig-to-traditional employment transition.
As the gig sector is considerably smaller than the traditional sector, a gig sector productivity shock
does not have the same impact as a traditional sector productivity shock. Gig employment increases;
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traditional-to-gig job transition. Workers make the gig-to-traditional job transition to fill the vacancies
left behind by workers in traditional-to-gig transition, and hiring from unemployment falls. Examining
Figs. 4.2) - 4.5), a pattern seems to emerge: where a shock induces a large increase in aggregate output,
there is hiring on the job and from unemployment, but where the shock induces a small aggregate output
increase, the unemployed are crowded out by job-changers.
Now turning to wages and output, Fig. 4.2) shows that in response to an aggregate demand shock, the
transition of workers from gig to traditional employment is greater than the transition from traditional to
gig or within gig employment. Hiring from unemployment largely falls. These result in a contraction of
the gig sector which moderates the positive impact of the aggregate demand shock on aggregate output.
Also, in response to aggregate demand shocks, firms create more vacancies. This means that market
tightness increases and the wage increases, but to varying extents in both sectors. The impulse response
for the wage in Fig. 4.2) reflects the relationship described in the wage equations in (4.36) and (4.37);
the traditional sector wage can be weighed down by the gig sector as the gig sector wage is improved by
the traditional sector. Fig. 4.2) also shows the moderating effect of the gig and traditional sectors on
aggregate output and the average wage in response to an aggregate demand shock.
The moderating impact on aggregate output and the wage brought on by the presence of the gig
economy is present for all other shocks, but to varying extents because of the marked difference in size
between the gig and traditional sectors. I find that as the traditional and gig sectors become equal in
size and number of workers, shocks no longer contract the gig sector, but the moderating effect of the
gig sector on the macroeconomy becomes more prominent.26 Put together, the results show how the UK
gig economy helps explain slow wage and output growth.
4.10 Conclusion
Gig work is potentially the future of employment, but it may not be without consequences. A significant
amount of attention is being paid to the increasing number of gig workers, but there is much less
research on the flows between the gig and traditional sectors, their respective output contribution or the
macroeconomic impact. I have begun to fill this gap.
I have shown that gig work can be a stepping-stone to traditional employment and vice versa, but
it can make job-finding difficult for the unemployed. This suggests that, under some circumstances,
gig working in the UK can become self-perpetuating: if workers who might have remained or become
unemployed in the absence of the gig sector can instead shuttle between sectors and gain an advantage
over the unemployed, then workers would take any job rather than remain or become unemployed. This
might reduce unemployment, but it would potentially reduce wages and the quality of work as the gig
economy expands.
Relatedly, workers taking on gig work after losing, or because they cannot find a traditional job, might
disguise unemployment and over-state the level of employment. To accurately assess the labour market
condition in an economy with a large gig sector, it may be necessary to prioritise underemployment and
workers’ reasons for engaging in gig work.
The results show that the presence of the gig economy changes the macroeconomic response to shocks.
The model shows that gig workers earn a lower wage than traditional workers doing the same job because
of differences in bargaining power and productivity. If these disparities between both sectors increase
and the gig sector expands, the labour market might become composed of a large number of workers
engaging in low-paid, low productivity work. This implies that the aggregate output, productivity and
wage growth can slow down or fall even when the output, productivity and wage in the traditional sector
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may be rising, due to the change in the composition of the labour market. In addition, the moderating
impact of shocks due to the presence of the gig economy, and, in particular, the contraction of the gig
sector in response to an aggregate demand shock suggests that the effect of policies might be muted,
or even distorted. This also suggests that it might be necessary for policy-makers to ensure that the
gig sector keeps up with the traditional sector with productivity enhancing training, initiatives and
technologies, and policies that enhance the conditions of work in the gig sector.
In future work, I will explore the impact of the rising gig economy on inflation and the implications
for policy-making, job and skill polarisation, underemployment, labour force and gender participation
and exposure to competition from the global labour market.
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.1 Appendix: Wage Determination
.1.1 Wage Determination in the Low Productivity Wholesale Firm
We assume that wage bargaining takes place between the firm and non-graduates.27 The bargained wage
is determined by the sharing rule
(1− ζl)Sl,ngt = ζlF lt (47)
where Sl,ngt is the surplus to the household from an additional non-graduate being employed in a low
productivity firm, F lt is the surplus to the firm and ζl is the bargaining power of non-graduates in the
low productivity sector.
The firm’s surplus is F l,ngt =
∂Jlt
∂N l,ngt
. Because of the assumption of constant returns, we can combine



















The surplus the household derives from successful conclusion of the wage bargain, which is employ-
ment of an additional non-graduate at the low productivity firm less the outside option of that worker,




























, where k denotes an alternative
low productivity firm, the successful conclusion of the wage bargain implies that the household gains
an additional non-graduate employed at a low productivity firm; this persists into the next period
with probability ρl,ngt . But the household loses an unemployed non-graduate, who would have moved
into alternative employment in the low productivity sector at the beginning of the next period with
probability f l,ng,ut+1 . This implies
Sl,ngt = w
b,l







The sharing rule in (47) implies that the household surplus can be written as
ζlF lt = (1− ζl)(w
b,l




t+1 )F lt+1 (52)




























+ (1− ζl)b (54)
27Although graduates and non-graduates have the same productivity and must be paid the same wage, a match with a
non-graduate has a different value to a low productivity firm than a match with a graduate, because the respective matches
break down with different probabilities.
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.1. Appendix: Wage Determination
.1.2 Wage Determination in the High Productivity Wholesale Firm
We assume that wages for high productivity jobs are determined through Nash bargaining between high
productivity wholesale firms and graduates. The bargained wage is chosen to maximise





where Sht is the surplus to the household from an additional graduate being employed in a high produc-
tivity firm, Fht is the surplus to the firm and ζh is the bargaining power of graduates in high productivity
jobs. This gives the sharing rule
(1− ζh)Sht = ζhFht (56)






















The surplus the household derives from successful conclusion of the wage bargain, which is employ-
ment of a graduate household member at the high productivity firm less the outside option of that











The successful conclusion of the wage bargain implies that the household gains an additional graduate
employed at a high productivity firm; this match persists into the next period with probability ρht . But the
household loses an unemployed graduate, who would have moved into alternative employment in the high
productivity sector with probability fh,g,ut+1 or alternative employment in the low productivity sector with


















where k here denotes an alternative high productivity firm and k′ denotes a low productivity firm. As
all high productivity firms are identical and all low productivity firms are identical, this implies
Sht = w
b,h
t − b+ Etβt,t+1(ρht − f
h,g,u





The sharing rules in (47) and (56) imply that the household surplus can be written as
ζhFht = (1− ζh)w
b,h
t − b+ ζhEtβt,t+1(ρht − f
h,g,u
































Aht + γhEtθht+1 + γlEtθlt+1
}
+ (1− ζh)b (64)
Noting that fh,g,ut = ζh,g,ufht and f
l,g,u





Aht + γhζh,g,uEtθht+1 + γlζl,g,uEtθlt+1
}




Figure 6: Aggregate Demand Shock with Equal Gig and Traditional Sectors
Figure 7: Aggregate Supply Shock with Equal Gig and Traditional Sectors
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. Appendix
Figure 8: Gig Sector Supply Shock with Equal Gig and Traditional Sectors
Figure 9: Traditional Sector Supply Shock with Equal Gig and Traditional Sectors
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